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really established.
·  Require the risk to be tracked until it is really closed out.
8.7.4 How Are Hazards/Risks Tracked?
There are many ways to track risks and hazards. See Chapter 4: Hazard Tracking and Risk Resolution
8.7.5 How Can Other Sources of Data be Used to Complete the Analysis?
The FMEA or FMECA can provide SSHA data. These analyses use a matrix format partially suitable for
an SSHA. It lists each component, the component function, types of failure, and the effects of the failures.
Most FMEAs also include component failure rate information. An FMEA can be used as a basis for an
SSHA, but several factors must be considered:
·  Many FMEAs do not list hazard categories (e.g., Category I - catastrophic) necessary for
hazard analyses.
FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 8: Safety Analysis/Hazard Analysis Tasks
December 30, 2000
8- 29
·  Hazards may not be resolved in a reliability analysis. These analyses emphasize failure
effects and rates. They do not always lead to or document corrective action for hazards.
·  Failure rate data used for reliability purposes may not be meaningful for safety analyses.
Failure rates THAT meet reliability requirements (normally in the .9 or .99 range) may not be
adequate to meet safety requirements (often in the .999999 range). In addition, many
reliability failures such as a leaking actuator may not be hazardous although in the case it
may, if undetected, become a safety issue as degradation continues. Some such as ruptured
actuator may be a hazard.
·  Sequential or multiple hazards might not be addressed, as well as risks.
·  FMEAs address only failures and ignore such safety related faults such as human or
procedural errors.
In spite of shortcomings, it is normally more cost effective to expand a reliability analysis to include
Hazard Category, Hazard Resolution, and to modify reliability data that is appropriate for safety to be
useful as an SSHA than starting from scratch.
An FTA is ideal for focusing on a single undesired event (e.g., failure of engine ignition) but is time
consuming and can be expensive. Nevertheless, the FTA should be used for any serious risk whose
causes are not immediately obvious (e.g., "0" ring failure) and that needs to be examined in detail because
of the concern over the effects of multiple failures and common cause failures. The approach is to list the
undesired events, then perform fault trees for each one.
8.8 Evaluating a System Hazard Analysis
For the most part, the comments in the previous section on SSHA apply also to the SHA. The SHA
analyzes the whole system and integrates SSHAs.
Ideally, the SHA will identify hazards and risks that apply to more than a single subsystem and are not
identified in the SSHAs. Most risks of this type result at interfaces between subsystems. For example, an
Air Traffic Control (ATC) might have separate SSHAs on the communications and data processing
systems. Assume that these SSHAs controlled all known critical and catastrophic hazards. The SHA
might identify a previously undiscovered hazard (e.g., incompatible maximum data transfer rates leading
to data corruption). The analysis approach is to examine the interfaces between subsystems. In addition,
the SHA looks for ways in which safety-critical system level functions can be lost.
Consider, for example, an aircraft anti-skid braking SSHA. It cannot be performed comprehensively if
the input information is limited to the landing gear design since there are many other subsystems that
interface with the anti-skid subsystem. For instance, the cockpit contains the control panel that turns the
anti-skid system on and off and notifies the crew of an anti-skid system failure. This control panel is
normally not documented in the landing gear design package and potential could be missed if the analysis
focuses only on the landing gear. Other brake system interfaces exist at the hydraulic and electrical
power supply subsystems. The SHA is designed to cut across all interfaces.
The system and subsystem definitions are important to the evaluation of a SHA. If the overall system
(and its subsystems) are not adequately defined, it is difficult to perform a successful SHA. In most
cases, system definition is simple. An aircraft, for example, can be a system. In an aircraft "system"
there are many subsystems, such as flight controls and landing gear.
Questions that should be considered by the evaluator:
FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 8: Safety Analysis/Hazard Analysis Tasks
December 30, 2000
8- 30
·  Are all the proper interfaces considered? It is obvious that aircraft flight control subsystems
　
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