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used, and interfaces with existing system(s). If an OED was performed during predevelopment,
this can form the basis for a system description.
·  A review of pertinent historical safety experience (lessons learned on similar systems)
·  A categorized listing of basic energy sources
·  An investigation of the various energy sources to determine the provisions that have been
developed for their control
·  Identification of the safety requirements and other regulations pertaining to personnel safety,
environmental hazards, and toxic substances with which the system must comply.
·  Recommendation of corrective actions.
Since the PHA should be initiated very early in the planning phase, the data available to the analyst may
be incomplete and informal. Therefore, the analysis should be structured to permit continual revision and
updating as the conceptual approach is modified and refined. As soon as the subsystem design details are
complete enough to allow the analyst to begin the subsystem hazard analysis in detail, the PHA can be
terminated. The PHA may be documented in any manner that renders the information above clear and
understandable to the non-safety community. A tabular format is usually used.
The following reference input information is helpful to perform a PHA:
·  Design sketches, drawings, and data describing the system and subsystem elements for the
various conceptual approaches under consideration
·  Functional flow diagrams and related data describing the proposed sequence of activities,
functions, and operations involving the system elements during the contemplated life span
·  Background information related to safety requirements associated with the contemplated
testing, manufacturing, storage, repair, and use locations and safety-related experiences of
similar previous programs or activities.
The PHA must consider the following for identification and evaluation of hazards as a minimum.
·  Hazardous components (e.g., fuels, propellants, lasers, explosives, toxic substances,
hazardous construction materials, pressure systems, and other energy sources).
·  Safety-related interface considerations among various elements of the system (e.g., material
compatibility, electromagnetic interference, inadvertent activation, fire/explosive initiation
and propagation, and hardware and software controls). This must include consideration of
the potential contribution by software (including software developed by other contractors) to
subsystem/system accidents.
·  Environmental constraints, including the operating environments (e.g., drop, shock, vibration,
extreme temperatures, noise, exposure to toxic substances, health hazards, fire, electrostatic
discharge, lightning, electromagnetic environmental effects, ionizing and non-ionizing
radiation).
FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 8: Safety Analysis/Hazard Analysis Tasks
December 30, 2000
8- 13
·  If available, operating, test, maintenance, and emergency procedures (e.g., human factors
engineering, human error analysis of operator functions, tasks, and requirements; effect of
factors such as equipment layout, lighting requirements, potential exposures to toxic
materials, effects of noise or radiation on human performance; life support requirements and
their safety implications in manned systems, crash safety, egress, rescue, survival, and
salvage).
·  If available, facilities, support equipment (e.g., provisions for storage, assembly, checkout,
proof testing of hazardous systems/assemblies that may involve toxic, flammable, explosive,
corrosive, or cryogenic materials/; radiation or noise emitters; electrical power sources), and
training (e.g., training and certification pertaining to safety operations and maintenance).
·  Safety-related equipment, safeguards, and possible alternate approaches (e.g., interlocks,
system redundancy, hardware or software fail-safe design considerations, subsystem
protection, fire detection and suppression systems, personal protective equipment, industrial
ventilation, and noise or radiation barriers).
8.4.3 Activity 3: Requirements Hazard Analysis
The purpose of Activity 3 is to perform and document the safety design requirements/design criteria for a
system or facility undergoing development or modification. It is also an opportunity to develop safety
requirements from regulations, standards, FAA Orders, Public Laws, etc. that are generic and not related
to a specific identified hazard. In the early system design phase, the developer can usually anticipate the
system design, including likely software control and monitoring functions. This information can be used
　
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