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Optimum
Safety
The associated risks that have been identified have been accepted provided that all identified
controls are implemented and enforced.
Phase Defined segment of work. Note: a phase does not imply the use of any specific life-cycle
model, nor does it imply a period of time in the development of a product.
Practice Recommended methods, rules, and designs for voluntary compliance.
Process Set of inter-related resources and activities, which transform inputs into outputs.
Product Service
History
Historical data generated by activities at the interface between the supplier and the customer
and by supplier internal activities to meet the customer needs regarding the quality, reliability
and safety trends of the product or service.
Product
Liability
Generic term used to describe the onus on a producer or others to make restitution for loss
related to personal injury, property damage or other harm caused by a product.
Proximate
Cause
The relationship between the plaintiff’s injuries and the plaintiff’s failure to exercise a legal
duty, such as reasonable care.
Primary
Hazard
A primary hazard is one that can directly and immediately results in: loss, consequence, adverse
outcome, damage, fatality, system loss, degradation, loss of function, injury, etc. The primary
hazard is also referred to as: catastrophe, catastrophic event, critical event, marginal event, and
negligible event.
Quality
Assurance
A planned and systematic pattern of actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that an
item or product conforms to established requirements.
Quality Audit Systematic and independent examination to determine whether quality activities and related
results comply with planned arrangements and whether these arrangements are implemented
effectively and are suitable to achieve objectives.
Quality
Evaluation
Systematic examination of the extent to which an entity is capable of fulfilling specified
requirements.
Qualification
Process
Process of demonstrating whether an entity is capable of fulfilling specified requirements.
Quantitative
Assessment.
In any discussion of mishap risk management and risk assessment, the question of quantified
acceptability parameters arises. Care should be exercised, under such conditions not to forget
the limitations of a mathematical approach. In any high-risk system, there is a strong
temptation to rely totally on statistical probability because, on the surface, it looks like a
convenient way to measure safety "who can argue with numbers"? To do so, however, requires
that the limitations and principles of this approach are well understood and that past
engineering experience is not ignored. Quantitative acceptability parameters must be well
FAA System Safety Handbook, Appendix A: Glossary
December 30, 2000
A -8
CONCEPT or
TERM
DESCRIPTION
defined, predictable, demonstrable, and above all, useful. They must be useful in the sense that
they can be easily related to the design and the associate decision criteria. More detail may be
found in chapter 7 on the limitations of the use of probabilities.
Many factors fundamental to system safety are not quantifiable. Design deficiencies are not
easily examined from a statistical standpoint. Additionally, the danger exists that system safety
analysts and managers will become so enamored with the statistics that simpler and more
meaningful engineering processes are ignored. Quantification of certain specific failure modes,
which depend on one of two system components, can be effective to bolster the decision to
accept or correct it.
General risk management principles are:
a. All human activity involving a technical device or process entails
some element of risk.
b. Most hazards (safety risks) can be neutralized or controlled.
c. Hazards should be kept in proper perspective. Weighing the risk
does this by knowledge gained through analysis and experience against
program need.
d. System operations represent a gamble to some degree; good analysis
assists the MA in controlling the risk.
e. System safety analysis and risk assessment does not eliminate the
need for good engineering judgment.
f. It is more important to establish clear objectives and parameters
for risk assessment than to find a cookbook approach and procedure.
g. There is no "best solution" to a safety problem. There are a variety of
directions to go. Each of these directions may produce some degree of
risk reduction.
Redundancy The existence in a system of more than one means of accomplishing a given function.
　
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