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hazards may be conducted according to the mishap risk potential they present.
A.4.4.4.2 System safety design order of precedence (see 4.4). The ultimate goal of a
system safety program is to design systems that contain no hazards. However, since the nature
of most complex systems makes it impossible or impractical to design them completely hazardfree,
a successful system safety program often provides a system design where there exist no
hazards resulting in an unacceptable level of mishap risk. As hazard analyses are performed,
hazards will be identified that will require resolution. The system safety design order of
precedence defines the order to be followed for satisfying system safety requirements and
reducing risks. The alternatives for eliminating the specific hazard or controlling its associated
risk are evaluated so that an acceptable method for mishap risk reduction can be agreed to.
A.4.4.5 Reduction of mishap risk to an acceptable level. Reduce the system mishap risk
through a mitigation approach mutually agreed to by the developer, program manager and the
using organization.
A.4.4.5.1 Communication with associated test efforts. Residual mishap risk and
associated hazards must be communicated to the system test efforts for verification.
A.4.4.6 Verification of mishap risk reduction. Verify the mishap risk reduction and
mitigation through appropriate analysis, testing, or inspection. Document the determined
residual mishap risk. The program manager must ensure that the selected mitigation approaches
will result in the expected residual mishap risk. To provide this assurance, the system test effort
should verify the performance of the mitigation actions. New hazards identified during testing
must be reported to the program manager and the developer.
A.4.4.6.1 Testing for a safe design. Tests and demonstrations must be defined to
validate selected safety features of the system. Test or demonstrate safety critical equipment and
procedures to determine the mishap severity or to establish the margin of safety of the design.
Consider induced or simulated failures to demonstrate the failure mode and acceptability of
safety critical equipment. When it cannot be analytically determined whether the corrective
action taken will adequately control a hazard, conduct safety tests to evaluate the effectiveness of
the controls. Where costs for safety testing would be prohibitive, safety characteristics or
procedures may be verified by engineering analyses, analogy, laboratory test, functional
mockups, or subscale/model simulation. Integrate testing of safety systems into appropriate
system test and demonstration plans to the maximum extent possible.
MIL-STD-882D
APPENDIX A
22
A.4.4.6.2 Conducting safe testing. The program manager must ensure that test teams are
familiar with mishap risks of the system. Test plans, procedures, and test results for all tests
including design verification, operational evaluation, production acceptance, and shelf-life
validation should be reviewed to ensure that:
a. Safety is adequately demonstrated.
b. The testing will be conducted in a safe manner.
c. All additional hazards introduced by testing procedures, instrumentation, test
hardware, and test environment are properly identified and controlled.
A.4.4.6.3 Communication of new hazards identified during testing. Testing
organizations must ensure that hazards and safety discrepancies discovered during testing are
communicated to the program manager and the developer.
A.4.4.7 Review and acceptance of residual mishap risk by the appropriate authority.
Notify the program manager of identified hazards and residual mishap risk. For long duration
programs, incremental or periodic reporting should be used.
A.4.4.7.1 Residual mishap risk. The mishap risk that remains after all planned mishap
risk management measures have been implemented is considered residual mishap risk. Residual
mishap risk is documented along with the reason(s) for incomplete mitigation.
A.4.4.7.2 Residual mishap risk management. The program manager must know what
residual mishap risk exists in the system being acquired. For significant mishap risks, the
program manager is required to elevate reporting of residual mishap risk to higher levels of
appropriate authority (such as the Program Executive Officer or Component Acquisition
Executive) for action or acceptance. The program manager is encouraged to apply additional
resources or other remedies to help the developer satisfactorily resolve hazards providing
significant mishap risk. Table A-IV includes an example of a mishap risk acceptance level
matrix based on the mishap risk assessment value and mishap risk category.
A.4.4.7.3 Residual mishap risk acceptance. The program manager is responsible for
　
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