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The commander did observe on the Load Form that all the baggage had been allocated to Hold 1 and
this prompted him to ask for the baggage to be moved to Holds 3 and 4 to move the CG further aft.
His concern was based on his recollection of a rejected takeoff above V1 involving a Boeing 737,
which had been operated by his previous employer, where the CG had been beyond the forward limit.
The FS was unaware of the information on the Load Form or the seating plan. Had she had sight of
the seating plan she would have appreciated the handling agent's intentions and how this differed from
the advice she had been given in the operator's procedures on passenger configuration. Armed with a
basic knowledge of the standard and non-standard loading procedures she would have been able to
confirm with the commander which of these two configurations was in use, or if one changed to the
other.
It is understandable that, with more passengers joining the aircraft at Zakinthos, the handling agent
elected to employ non-standard loading. However, this was not communicated to the commander
who completed the Trim Sheet on the basis of a standard passenger loading, as indicated on the Load
Form. The commander had advised the FS, on the previous positioning sector, that he wanted the
passengers joining in Kefallinia to be spread evenly throughout the cabin (standard loading), although
he did not mind if they were predominantly in the middle and rear sections (non standard loading).
The FS had understood the commander to mean that the majority of the passengers should be sat at
the rear of the cabin and, following his instruction to move the passengers seated at the front of the
cabin further aft, all passengers were subsequently seated behind Row 13. The result of this was that
the CG was sufficiently beyond the aft limit that, when take-off thrust was selected and the aircraft
started its take-off roll, the aircraft pitched up rapidly due to the couple created by the increasing
engine thrust. By selecting idle thrust and applying the brakes, the commander was able to lower the
nose wheel back on to the runway and restrict damage to that sustained by the rear galley drain mast.
The FS told the passengers who were moved aft that they could return to their original seats after the
aircraft had taken off, which would have resulted in a significant CG shift, albeit back to within limits,
once the aircraft was airborne. A basic knowledge of the concept of CG would have made the FS
aware of the effect that moving passengers about in the cabin would have on an aircraft's CG.
The commander carried the responsibility for ensuring that the operator's loading procedures were
complied with. By completing the Standard Loading part of the Load Form, the handling agent led
the commander to believe that the passengers were evenly distributed throughout the cabin. Without
entering the cabin himself or being advised that it was otherwise, he had no way of knowing that the
aim was to split the passengers between the front five rows and the last six and a half rows in the
cabin. The provision of the seating plan with the Load Form would have highlighted this intention
and the erroneous completion of the Load Form. The conversation between the commander and the
FS before arrival at Kefallinia, regarding passenger distribution, suggested that the crew did not
appreciate that the handling agent would be allocating passengers specific seats.
Conclusions
Neither the commander nor the FS were aware which seats the handling agent had allocated to the
passengers boarding the aircraft at Kefallinia. The Load Form indicated that the passengers had been
Airbus A320-214, G-OOAR
5
subject to standard loading and were spread evenly between the three bays in the cabin. However, the
seating plan, which the crew did not see, showed that the passengers had been allocated the first five
rows and the last six and a half rows in the cabin, leaving the remaining seats for the passengers due
to join the aircraft in Zakinthos. This amounted to non-standard passenger loading but the
commander completed the Trim Sheet on the basis of standard passenger loading, whilst taking
account of the non-standard baggage loading.
The commander bore responsibility for the correct use of the loading procedures. Without a sight of
the handling agent's seating plan, he was reliant on the information on the Load Form. The FS saw
neither of these two documents, although both were at variance with the passenger distribution
indicated in the operator's advice to cabin crew for a partial passenger load. The commander's
instruction to the FS to move the passengers at the front of the cabin further aft was not understood in
the way that he intended, moreover, it reinforced his previous instruction that the passengers should
　
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