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Between 15 h 45 min 45 s and 15 h 45 min 49 s, a slight drop in engine EPR (from 1.45 to
1.44) and an increase in N1 RPM (from 88 % to 90 % for engine 1 and from 88 % to 92 % for
engine 2) were observed.
Between 15 h 45 min 49 s and 15 h 45 min 53 s, the Captain made a longitudinal input
towards the rear. The elevator reached values of about 30° nose up.
At 15 h 45 min 50 s, the normal load factor exceeded 0.5 g. The thrust control levers were
placed in the CLIMB position (25°) for a second then repositioned on TO/GA.
At 15 h 45 min 52 s, the stall warning sounded again. The ENG page was recorded as
displayed on the ECAM.
At 15 h 45 min 53 s, the pitch reached 7° nose down. The recorded speed became valid
again at 46 kt. The bank angle was below 10°, to the left. The FAC 1 FAIL and FAC 2 FAIL
parameters passed temporarily to NOT FAIL. Flight Director 1 re-activated temporarily.
During the period when the speed was invalid, the RTL value dropped to about 31.5°. It was
at 32 ° as soon as the speed became valid again.
Between 15 h 45 min 55 s and 15 h 45 min 58 s, the Captain made a lateral input to the left
stop; the airplane began to roll to the right. The bank angle went from 3° to 97° to the right. At
the same time, the pitch went from 3 ° to 42 ° nose down.
From 15 h 45 min 57 s, the Captain’s longitudinal input was nose up, the elevator was at
14.5° nose down.
At 15 h 45 min 58 s, the flaps and slats were selected to position 1, then to position 0 two
seconds later.
At 15 h 46 min 00 s, the stall warning stopped and was followed by a CRC warning that
corresponded to a Master Warning, which stopped two seconds later.
At 15 h 46 min 01 s, the pitch reached a maximum of 51° nose down. The bank angle was
45° to the right, the speed was 183 kt and the altitude about 1,620 ft. From this moment on,
the Captain’s longitudinal input was to the rear stop.
At 15 h 46 min 02 s, the thrust control levers were pulled back towards a position close to
IDLE (about 6°). The EPR on both engines dropped towards 1.2.
At 15 h 46 min 02 s, the thrust control levers were placed on CLIMB. The EPR on both
engines increased towards 1.25.
3 The parameter is invalid (NCD) below 40 kt.
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At 15 h 46 min 04 s, a GPWS TERRAIN TERRAIN warning was recorded.
At 15 h 46 min 05 s, another CRC warning (Master Warning) was set off.
The recordings stopped at 15 h 46 min 06.8 s. The last recorded values were a pitch of 14°
nose down, a bank angle of 15° to the right, a speed of 263 kt and an altitude of 340 ft.
1.11.5 Trajectory
The following horizontal flight trajectory was made based on data from the FDR and the
CVR.
1.12 Wreckage and Impact information
The wreckage was located about five kilometres off the coast on muddy seafloor. The zone
covered measured 700 x 400 metres. The depth varied between 30 and 50 metres.
1.13 Medical and Pathological Information
The examinations carried out on the victims did not provide any information relevant to the
understanding of the accident.
1.14 Fire
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There was no fire.
1.15 Survival Aspects
The airplane wreckage and its spread bear witness to the violence of the impact with the surface
of the sea. Under such conditions, the accident was not survivable for the occupants.
1.16 Tests and Research
1.16.1 Underwater Searches
The BEA participated in the operations to locate the recorders and identify aircraft parts.
Operations to search for and recover wreckage from the airplane are still under way.
1.16.1.1 Information available
Ships went to the area in the hours following the accident. Witness testimony and the floating
debris did not make it possible to determine a precise enough zone to begin the undersea
search for the flight recorders.
The initial data from the Montpellier civil secondary radar allowed a starting point to be
determined, whose coordinates were N42°40’34.56’’ E003°06’31.43’’ (WGS84).
1.16.1.2 Detection and localisation of recorders
N.B.: Every flight recorder4 is equipped with a beacon (ULB5) designed to transmit a signal
over a theoretical period of thirty days, when immersed in water. The use of a hydrophone
makes it possible to listen to and quantify the signal transmitted by the beacon and thus to
define a search area.
The ships and equipment mobilized for the detection, the localisation and the recovery of the
recorders were:
 A minesweeper from the French Navy used as a support boat. This ship had two light
boats that made it possible to use the directional hydrophones.
 The CEPHISMER6 Omni directional and directional detection equipment (French
　
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