曝光臺(tái) 注意防騙 網(wǎng)曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費(fèi)者

on EAS Industries premises.
1.18.1.2 Approach controller
The approach controller stated that the air traffic was light and that she had not noticed any
anomalies as regards the exchanges with the crew of D-AXLA.
After having cleared the airplane for the VOR DME ILS approach to runway 33, she noticed
on her screen that the airplane’s speed was high and that this could cause problems of
separation with the preceding airplane, a B737. She then asked the crew on two occasions
to reduce its speed. After having asked them to contact the tower, she noticed on her screen
a deviation of the trajectory to the left. The loss of radar contact occurred shortly afterwards.
After having alerted the rescues and fire fighting service, she telephoned to the duty room
and, at the same time, received a call from the emergency medical service.
1.18.1.3 Eyewitnesses
Many people witnessed the end of the airplane’s flight. They were spread out along the coast
between Sainte Marie and Saint Cyprien. Yachtsmen and fishermen were on board three
boats near the area of the accident.
- 30 -
Despite the divergences that can be explained by the different angles, all of the testimony
allowed the end of the flight to be broken down into three major phases:
 The airplane was seen in level flight above the sea on approach towards the coast.
Those who heard the engines stated that they were surprised and drawn by the
sound of loud acceleration that was regular and unbroken. Several people said that it
sounded like the noise generated by airplane during takeoff.
 A few seconds after the increase in the engine rpm, all the witnesses saw the airplane
suddenly adopt a pitch up attitude that they estimated as being between 60 and
90°. The majority of the witnesses saw the airplane disappear behind a cloud layer.
The noise generated by the engines was still constant and regular.
 The airplane reappeared after a few seconds with a very steep nose-down angle.
During the descent, the airplane pitch seemed to increase and the airplane struck the
surface of the sea. Some witnesses remember a very loud « throbbing » that they
heard until the impact.
1.18.2 FAA safety message
On 12 October 2008, the United States civil aviation authority, the FAA, issued a Safety Alert
for Operators that recommends that operators, according to the means that they have available
for analysis, should analyse data from FDR‘s following non-revenue flights so as to
identify any deviations from procedures (see appendix 5).
In fact, the National Transportation Safety Board (the US counterpart of the BEA) determined
that, in the last ten years, twenty-five percent of accidents to turbine airplanes occurred during
non-revenue flights, such as ferry and positioning flights.
Two factors contributed to these accidents: failure to respect standard operating procedures
or a failure to respect the airplane’s limitations.
- 31 -
2 - SAFETY RECOMMENDATION
Note: in accordance with article 10 of Directive 94/56/CE on accident investigations, a safety
recommendation shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability for an accident or
incident. Article R.731-2 of the Civil Aviation Code specifies that those to whom safety
recommendations are addressed should make known to the BEA, within a period of ninety
days of reception, the actions that they intend to take and, if appropriate, the time period
required for their implementation.
The flight performed was intended to check the condition of the airplane in service, at the end
of a leasing agreement. This type of flight, though not exceptional in worldwide air transport,
is not included in the list of non-revenue flights detailed in the EU-OPS (1.1045), given that
this list has no precisions or definitions for the aforementioned flights. Up to now, the BEA
has been unable to identify any text applicable to EU states or to non-EU states that sets a
framework for non-revenue flights, or indeed for « acceptance » flights. In addition, no
documents detail the constraints to be imposed on these flights or the skills required of the
pilots. As a result, operators are obliged to define for themselves the programme and the
operational conditions for these flights in their operations manual, without necessarily having
evaluated the specific risks that these flights may present. It appears that the majority of
operators assimilate acceptance flights with check flights performed after certain
maintenance operations.
In the context of their agreement, Air New Zealand and XL Airways Germany had agreed on
a programme of in-flight checks based on an Airbus programme used for flights intended for
　
中國航空網(wǎng) www.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：航空資料8(133)