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alternate airport Gothenburg. On the destination Arlanda the weather was good, but
there was forecasted temporarily fog and visibility 500 m on the morning between 06
and 07 UTC. The scheduled arrival time of the flight was 05.35 UTC. The pilots concluded
that no problems would be expected and agreed the 51.0 t fuel uplift. The fuel
calculations in the OFP included 0.7 t for taxi, 42.4 t trip fuel to Arlanda, 1.3 t contingency
fuel and 6.4 t minimum diversion fuel from Arlanda to Gothenburg containing alternate
trip fuel of 4.1 t and a final reserve fuel of 2.3 t. The commander received information
that take-off weight (TOW) would be 1.6 t more than the 211.3 t calculated in the
OFP and decided for that reason to take 0.2 t of extra fuel. The actual difference between
the planned and the actual TOW was 1800 kilos. The actual TOW was 213.1 t
and maximum TOW of the aircraft was 233 t.
The flight departed seven minutes behind the schedule, taxiing went normally and the
take-off fuel was 50.3 t.
2.2 Flight en route
The received flight levels were according to the flight plan and SK946 got a slight shortcut
one hour and twenty-five minutes after departure. Fuel used was more than calculated
in the OFP. 200 kg extra was burned 45 minutes after departure and after 2 h 48
min of flight time 700 kg of contingency was used. On 30 W 4 h 36 min after departure
the fuel used was 900 kg more than calculated and the flight was four minutes behind
the time calculated in OFP.
The commander had gone to rest and the first officer and the relief pilot operated the
aircraft. They told to the investigators in their interview that they were not concerned of
the fuel. According to their statements it is normal that the fuel goes below the calculations
and comes back again to the values calculated in the OFP and that the fuel quantity
indicators of A330 are not very reliable. If the fuel quantity indicators are unreliable
the fuel should be checked more closely, compare the quantity indicators to the used
fuel indicators and use a more economical cruising procedure if the fuel quantity indication
is suspected to be misleading.
The pilots flew on the planned flight level maintaining the cleared speed Mach 0.82.
Even though the flight was over the Atlantic it would have been possible to be active and
use the Optimisation and predictions ability of the FMGS. Even though the communicaC
9/2003 L
Airliner landing with low fuel at Helsinki-Vantaa airport on 3.10.2003
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tions are handled via the HF -radio over the Atlantic, it is possible to request a change of
the flight level or the cruising Mach-number with a short delay.
SK946 had used by the longitude 10 W all of the contingency fuel of 1.3 t and was five
minutes behind the time calculated in the OFP. By the reporting point SOPAR the fuel
used was 1.5 ton more than calculated. After this point the pilots had marked no fuel
checks in the OFP.
The commander took his leadership lightly during cruise. He rested and did not worry
about the progress of his flight. The 500 kg of fuel which was lacking in landing on the
alternate airport would have been possible to save during the cruise if the pilots had operated
the aircraft keeping the fuel economy as goal, because the weight of the aircraft
was not heavy and a wide performance envelope was available for saving fuel. When
the fuel quantity goes below the calculated value during cruise, a good habit of action of
the pilots is to try to improve the fuel economy of the flight.
The first officer and the relief pilot told in their interview that the contingency fuel is for an
unexpected additional fuel consumption during cruise and the purpose is not to save the
contingency fuel for the approach. During the flight in question there were no unexpected
factors, such as lower flight level or longer flight route which would have differed
from the calculation of the OFP. The fuel flow was higher than calculated during all
stages of the flight and extra fuel was needed for the approach.
2.3 Approach to Stockholm-Arlanda
When SK946 descended for the approach to Arlanda the runway visual range (RVR) on
rwy 01L was 500 m and low visibility procedures (LVP) were in force. The commander
took his position on the left cockpit seat and controls by ELTOK. The pilots requested
CAT II approach. The ATC cleared SK946 to holding, but the pilots informed that due to
fuel situation they were unable to hold and requested approach. SK946 managed to
change approach sequence with one other aircraft of the company. According to the relief
pilot’s statement it is stated in the Operations Manual of the airline that when arriving
to Arlanda during the morning peak hours the aircraft should have 15 minutes of extra
　
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