曝光臺(tái) 注意防騙 網(wǎng)曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營(yíng)店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費(fèi)者

All of the factors discussed above probably play a role in success in
the Chinese market, but the key appears to be an aggressive program of local production. For example, in 2005, a group of Chinese airlines contracted with Boeing to purchase up to 60 Boeing 787 Dreamliners, a deal worth $7.2 billion at nominal list prices (Gates, 2005). Later the same year, it was announced that Boeing had selected a number of Chi-nese manufacturers as suppliers to the 787 program, including several single-source contracts on some of the largest components awarded to a Chinese supplier to date. In all, Boeing sold a total of 117 aircraft to Chinese airlines that year, making 2005 Boeing’s most successful year in China to date (“Orders and Deliveries—User Defined Reports”).
That same year, however, Airbus secured an order for 150 A320 airliners from China in a deal valued at close to $10 billion (“Airbus in China,” 2010). It was subsequently revealed that Airbus had reached an agreement with China to establish its first final assembly line out-side of Europe in Tianjin, and Airbus was rewarded with a contract for another 150 A320s and 20 A350s in 2006. In 2007, French President Nicholas Sarkozy returned from a state visit to China with the larg-est Airbus order from China to date, a $17.4 billion contract for 110 A320s and 50 wide-body A330s. Most recently, Chinese president Hu Jintao concluded another agreement with Airbus during his November 2010 state visit to France, an order for 50 A320s, 42 A330s, and 10 A350s valued at $14 billion, with half of the A320s to be assembled in China (Fouquet and Viscusi, 2010). By comparison, during the same period (2006–2010) Boeing sold a total of only 287 airliners in China (“Orders and Deliveries—User Defined Reports”).
In conclusion, Chinese government leverage over large commer-cial aircraft sales has caused Boeing and Airbus to transfer older pro-duction and assembly technology to China, but no Chinese companies are yet Tier 1 suppliers to Boeing or Airbus. To increase technology transfer, COMAC is partnering and establishing joint ventures with many Western companies through the ARJ21 and C919 projects. However, those Western companies have a vested interest in maintain-ing control of their core intellectual property, which likely explains why most of the technologies planned for the C919 are, with a few exceptions, already currently deployed in modern airliners (Mecham and Anselmo, 2010).
It should also be pointed out that the interests of Chinese state-owned enterprises are not identical to those of the Chinese govern-ment. This is most obvious in the case of China’s state-owned airlines, which have resisted large-scale commitments to the ARJ21 and C919 despite the central government’s desire to establish COMAC as one of the world’s leading manufacturers of regional jets and airliners. Simi-larly, AVIC has been pursuing its own jet transport projects, which would compete with those of COMAC.
　
中國航空網(wǎng) www.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：Ready for Takeoff China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry(29)