曝光臺(tái) 注意防騙 網(wǎng)曝天貓店富美金盛家居專(zhuān)營(yíng)店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費(fèi)者

The technologies being transferred to Chinese firms are in most instances not cutting-edge. Leading aerospace firms are generally reluctant to share their best technologies, because those technologies are the source of their competitive advantage. As an example, Rolls-Royce is unwilling to share its technology for forging unitary turbine rings (known as bladed-rings, or “blings”) with its own wholly owned subsidiary in Indianapolis, preferring instead to keep this “crown-jewel” technology at its facility in the United Kingdom.2 Out-of-date Western technologies, however, can still be new technologies to China, which, for example, has yet to master the technology for turbo- fan engines, which first entered production 50 years ago in the West (Younossi et al., 2002, pp. 9–24). But the nature of the aerospace
2 Interview with Rolls-Royce representative, 2003.
technologies being transferred to China and the range of alternative technology sources available make the U.S. security policy implica-tions opaque. Since it is difficult to quantify the degree to which inter-national cooperation in civil aerospace is assisting the development of military aerospace capabilities in China, whether even a complete cutoff of such cooperation would substantially slow that development is equally unclear. A complete cutoff, moreover, would be impractical. Russia in particular is unlikely to go along with a U.S.-organized ban on cooperation in civil aerospace with China, and whether European and other Asian countries would do so is also questionable. A U.S.-only ban would likely slow the development of China’s military aerospace capability by only a small amount while handing business opportuni-ties to European and Asian companies and aggravating relations with Beijing. At a minimum, a smart U.S. policy would limit restrictions to cooperation in technology areas that are not available from other coun-tries or in which other countries that also possess those technologies are willing to coordinate with the United States in imposing restrictions.
China’s emergence as an aerospace power is perhaps inevitable but hardly an accomplished fact. It will be at least another decade before China has reached today’s state of the art, and by then, the state of the art will have moved further ahead in ways that are, by the nature of technological discovery, fundamentally unknowable in advance. U.S. and other Western companies are deeply involved in China’s aerospace development, and although this is unquestionably contributing to the development of China’s military aerospace capabilities—capabilities that one day might be used against the United States—those compa-nies are reaping profits for their American shareholders and keeping Americans employed, even as they transfer lower-value-added produc-tion to China. They are also helping raise the standards of living of some of the one-fifth of the world’s population that lives in China, increasing their ability to buy American-made products. And war with China may never come. The policy choices here are far from black-and-white, and it is unclear whether the United States could significantly improve its security through alterations of its policy toward civil aero-space cooperation with China without having a significant negative effect on U.S. economic interests.
　
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