曝光臺 注意防騙 網曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費者

China’s space capabilities have improved rapidly in the past decade and a half. China’s Long March series have arguably become the world’s most reliable medium space launch vehicles. China has also developed and deployed a series of weather satellites; electro-optical reconnaissance satellites; position, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellites; ocean- surveillance satellites; synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites; high-capacity communications satellites; and possibly signals-intelligence or electronic-intelligence satellites. China has also become the third coun-try to put humans in space. Over the next decade, China’s surveillance and reconnaissance, communications, and weather satellite capabilities will undoubtedly improve further, and by 2020, China will likely have a fully deployed satellite PNT system comparable to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS).
There is no question that China’s growing civilian aerospace capabilities are contributing to the development of its military aero-space capabilities. Many aerospace systems are inherently dual-use or can provide a basis for the development of military systems. Moreover, many of the skills and technologies required to produce commercial or dual-use aerospace products are also applicable to purely military systems. And given that China and the United States have conflict-ing interests in East Asia and elsewhere, China’s growing aerospace capabilities increase its ability and possibly its propensity to use force in ways that negatively affect U.S. interests and would increase the costs—human and material—of resisting such force.
Foreign involvement in China’s civil aerospace sector has unques-tionably contributed to its development and thus to the development of China’s military capabilities. However, it is difficult to quantify the extent to which international cooperation in the civilian aerospace sector is driving improvements in those capabilities. This makes the implications for U.S. security policy unclear. A complete cutoff of international cooperation in the civilian aerospace sector is impracti-cal, as many countries would refuse to go along with such an embargo. A U.S.-only ban would likely slow the development of China’s mili-tary aerospace capability by only a small amount while handing busi-ness opportunities to European and Asian companies and aggravating relations with Beijing. Moreover, conflict or confrontation with China is not inevitable. Thus, whether the United States could significantly improve its security through alterations of its policy toward civil aero-space cooperation with China without having a significant negative effect on its own economic interests is unclear.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank John Dotson and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission for their flexibility and patience during the preparation of this monograph. We would also like to thank Michael Lostumbo, Associate Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Program at RAND, for his support and understanding; Tony Starkey of RAND Europe for advice and sugges-tions based on a study of the British aerospace industry he conducted; Larry Hanauer of RAND and Tai Ming Cheung of the University of California, San Diego, for their thoughtful and incisive reviews; and Christin Strifler, Jocelyn Lofstrom, and Janet DeLand of RAND for their assistance in the preparation of the monograph.
　
中國航空網 www.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：Ready for Takeoff China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry(7)