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operators and ATS authorities. The intent is to improve standard operating procedures, thereby reducing the
future frequency of operational errors and thus contribute to the safety of the overall system.
9.3.4 At RVSM levels, moderate and severe turbulence may also increase the level of system risk
and crews should report ALL occasions, whilst flying in MNPS Airspace, when a 300 ft or more deviation
occurs. The form at Attachment 2 may also be used for this purpose.
9.3.5 The technical height-keeping accuracies of NAT aircraft are passively monitored during
flight over a Height Monitoring Unit (HMU) located near to Strumble in Wales. Alternatively, individual
aircraft can be monitored through temporary carriage of portable GPS (Height) Monitoring Units (GMUs).
Furthermore, height monitoring data is available to the NAT CMA from the 3 European HMUs. This
monitoring allows the height-keeping accuracies of aircraft types and individual operator’s fleets to be
assessed. Any single airframe which does not meet required standards can also be identified. On such
occasions the operator and the State of Registry are advised of the problem and corrective action must be
undertaken before further flights in RVSM airspace are conducted.
9.3.6 The overall vertical navigation performance of all aircraft in NAT RVSM airspace is
continually assessed and compared to the standards established for the Region, to ensure that the relevant
TLS is being maintained.
NORTH ATLANTIC MNPSA OPERATIONS MANUAL CHAPTER 10
NAT MNPS 58 Edition 2008
Chapter 10: Procedures in the Event of Navigation System
Degradation or Failure
10.1 GENERAL
10.1.1 The navigation systems fitted to MNPS approved aircraft are generally very accurate and
very reliable and GNEs as a result of system technical failures are rare in NAT MNPS Airspace.
Nevertheless, the risks that such errors pose can be significant and crews must employ rigorous procedures to
ensure early detection of any possible errors and hence mitigation of the ensuing risk. The NAT CMA
thoroughly investigates the circumstances of all reported GNEs in the MNPS Airspace. The majority are the
result of human error, and diligent application by crews of operating procedures such as those described in
Chapter 8 should help to minimise the frequency of such errors. As previously stated, actual failures of
navigation systems or equipment in MNPS approved aircraft occur very rarely. However, when they do
occur, their potential effects on the aircraft’s navigation capability can be subtle or progressive, resulting in a
gradual and perhaps not immediately discernible degradation of performance. ‘Vigilance’ must be the
watchword when navigating in NAT MNPS Airspace. ‘Complacency’ has no place here.
10.1.2 For unrestricted operation in MNPS Airspace an approved aircraft must be equipped with a
minimum of two fully serviceable LRNSs. MNPS approved aircraft which have suffered any equipment
failures prior to NAT entry that result in only a single LRNS remaining serviceable may still be flight
planned and flown through the MNPS Airspace but only on specified routes established for this purpose.
Aircraft may be approved for NAT MNPS operations with only a single LRNS. However, such aircraft are
only permitted to plan and fly on these same specified routes and on certain other routes serving individual
traffic axes e.g. the Tango Routes, Routes between the Iberian Peninsular and the Azores/Madeira and
Routes between Iceland and Greenland (See Chapter 3 of this Manual).
10.1.3 If after take-off, abnormal navigation indications relating to INS or IRS systems occur, they
should be analysed to discover their cause. Unless the flight can proceed safely using alternative approved
navigation sources only, the pilot should consider landing at the nearest appropriate airfield to allow the
problem to be fully investigated, using technical assistance if necessary. Under no circumstances should a
flight continue into oceanic (MNPS) Airspace with unresolved navigation system errors, or with errors which
have been established to have been caused by inertial platform misalignment or initial data input error.
10.1.4 Crew training and consequent approval for MNPS operations should include instruction on
what actions are to be considered in the event of navigation system failures. This Chapter provides guidance
on the detection of failures and what crew action should be considered, together with details of the routes
that may be used when the aircraft’s navigation capability is degraded below that required for unrestricted
operations in NAT MNPS Airspace.
Detection of Failures
10.1.5 Normally, navigation installations include comparator and/or warning devices, but it is still
　
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