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further degradation of pilot authority. To give an automatic system the ability to take control
from the pilot and effect recoveries from a possibly false warning without pilot over-ride
capability is unconscionable. The argument is that an aircraft with this many people cannot
afford to allow the pilots the luxury of delaying the recovery. There have been numerous cases
of aircraft receiving a GPWS terrain warning while at high altitude, in a holding pattern17. The
warning in the holding pattern often results from the radar altimeter locking onto another
aircraft. For an aircraft to initiate a climbing recovery in such a situation could be catastrophic.
There are many considerations and safety interlocks that must be addressed for such a system
to even be considered. There are also human factor issues such as, flight crew reaction when
the aircraft starts an abrupt climbing maneuver? Would the crew be startled and perceive this
as an autopilot or aircraft malfunction. The issue must be addressed; does this system
enhance or decrease safety?
8.0 CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
The pilot in command is the final authority. The pilot in command is the arbitrator should a
conflict arise. Only the pilot in command can make real time, on scene decisions concerning
the safe conduct of the flight. To arbitrarily abrogate this legal position of authority and
17 personal experience of author.
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responsibility because of well-intentioned, but flawed design can not be condoned. It is the
position of this committee that a proper protection system must function without
restricting the function and command authority of the pilot in command.
Pilot authority means that the pilot has the ability, if necessary, to access maximum aircraft
performance, consistent with safe operation. Flight envelope protection features can form an
indispensable part of that authority and these envelope protections features need to be
standardized in the industry.
8.1 Conclusions
· Pilot in command authority must not be limited. Desired and appropriate pilot actions
must be allowed especially in an emergency situation. What is the desired and
appropriate action must be at the final discretion of the pilot.
· Protection schemes need to be properly implemented in aircraft design and the aircraft
flight envelope must be appropriately protected.
· Operators of fleets with a mix of conventional and FBW aircraft should reevaluate the
benefits of a fleet standard CFIT recovery procedure vs. a FBW aircraft specific
procedure that would provide such aircraft with better performance.
· The A320/330 full aft stick CFIT recovery vs 3 deg/sec pull gave better and more
consistent performance without any increase in risk of exceeding envelope parameters.
No additional or specific pilot training was necessary to perform the full aft stick
recovery technique since the FBW design provides excellent pitch rate and g control as
well as excellent envelope protection for stall, overstress, or overspeed.
· The evaluation pilotsÕ found that the enhanced flight path control precision and
envelope protection features available through FBW design were highly desirable. The
evaluation team preferred the flight envelope limiting features (Òsoft limitsÓ) of the
B777 design to a Òhard limitÓ design. This was a subjective judgement based on the
premise that there may be situations unforeseen by the designers where the pilot might
need to achieve full aerodynamic capability as opposed to being software/control law
limited. Another approach may be to incorporate Òhard limitsÓ with a pilot override
capability such as an Òinstinctive cut-outÓ switch.
· The most effective flight control system would be one that combines the best
features of both the current hard and soft flight control system designs. This
desired flight control system would then be one that allows the pilot to easily
attain maximum allowable aircraft performance (as with the design of current
hard flight control systems). However, if the pilot desired increased
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performance, the hard limits could be over-ridden and full aerodynamic
performance could be attained (as is the capability with current design of soft
flight control systems). In addition, a g limiting system could be designed that
takes into account current weight, Mach, airspeed, and CG, and varies the hard
limit accordingly.
8.2 Recommendations
· To maintain pilot authority over a malfunctioning on-ground sensing system, a method
of pilot over-ride must be provided.
· To maintain pilot authority over a malfunctioning stall warning system, a method of
　
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