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of the BSCU at Autobrake selection. However, only the first disagree
occurrence (BRAKES BSCU CH2 FAULT) was annunciated to the crew
via the ECAM. The presence of the second BSCU CH1 disagree was
stored in the CFDIU failure messages but was not transmitted to the
ECAM. The crew was therefore not given a complete indication of the
true state of the aircraft system by the ECAM. It is therefore
recommended that Airbus Industrie improve the ECAM indication logic
such that a full and accurate indication is available to the crew about the
true status of the BSCU system, and its effect upon the availability of the
Normal Braking System at touchdown.
II. The FCOM reference for the single Channel Fault indicated that it was for
‘crew awareness’ only. Thus, the FCOM material did not assist the crew in
troubleshooting the initial event and there was no reference to the
Supplementary Techniques which could have been applicable. It is
therefore recommended to Airbus Industrie that when ‘Crew Awareness’ is
indicated in the FCOM, additional references to relevant FCOM
information should be provided.
III. The possibility existed that the crew could have reset the BSCU after the
initial Autobrake selection. However, under certain conditions, it would
not be prudent to conduct a BSCU reset. It is therefore recommended that
Airbus Industrie clearly define in the FCOM the conditions under which a
BSCU reset is permitted.
IV. The main BSCU switch is currently named A/SKID & N/W STRG. This
does not fully reflect the effect of its operation, i.e. a reset of the BSCU
computer. It is therefore recommended that Airbus Industrie change the
name of the A/SKID & N/W STRG switch to a fully describe its function
as a A/SKID, N/W STRG & BSCU switch.
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V. BSCU computer software standard 8, superseded by standard 9, introduced
improvements to avoid the logic disagreement condition when selecting
the Autobrake LO or MED modes. It is therefore recommended to the
Certification Authority (DGAC) that it should evaluate the suitability of
making mandatory its implementation.
VI. At touchdown the Normal Braking System was lost. The appropriate
warning to the crew was inhibited during the landing phase. It is therefore
recommended to Airbus Industrie that warning messages about any change
in the status of the braking system during the landing phase be immediately
communicated to the crew via the ECAM Warning system without delay.
VII. The warning message which would have been transmitted, BRAKES
AUTO BRAKE FAULT only describes the Autobrake fault and not the
resulting loss of the Normal Brake system. It is therefore recommended to
Airbus Industrie that the loss of the Normal Brake System should be
clearly indicated to the crew through an ECAM Warning message.
VIII. With the loss of the Normal and Alternate Braking System it was still
possible to stop the aircraft using the Parking Brake. However the crew
were not trained in this technique. It is therefore recommended to Airbus
Industrie that they include the technique for use of the Parking Brake as an
Emergency Brake in a flight simulator demonstration during the pilot
training syllabus.
IX. If the Parking Brake is available to be used as an Emergency Braking
device, then it is recommended that Airbus Industrie should rename it as a
Parking and Emergency Brake to highlight its use in such a manner.
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APPENDIX A
Path followed by the aircraft.
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APPENDIX B
Description of the Braking System, schematics, warning messages, supplementary
techniques, and emergency procedure.
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APPENDIX C
DFDR internal fault photographs.
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APPENDIX D
Charts obtained from DFDR data.
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APPENDIX E
Section of the BDDV and temperature charts of the in-flight tests.
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APPENDIX F
Oscilloscope chart of the pressing times of the AUTO/BRK LO and acquisition times by the
command and monitor functions
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APPENDIX G
Copy of the Post Flight Report.
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APPENDIX H
ILS Approach Chart to Ibiza Airport Runway 24.
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APPENDIX I
Photographs
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INDEX OF PHOTOGRAPHS
Nr. 1.- GENERAL VIEW.-- Right side.
Nr. 2.- FRONT VIEW.-- Nose above a low earth bank.
Nr. 3.- PATH ONROUGH TERRAIN.
Nr. 4.- REAR VIEW.
Nr. 5.-A/C PATH AND AIRFIELD LIGHTS BROKEN.
　
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