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showed that the aircraft had made two swerving turns before running off the
end of the runway. The path of the aircraft as it ran off the end could be seen
clearly by the marks left by the tyres of all the landing gear wheels. The initial
swerve to the right, on the runway, could be detected by tracing the marks left
by the tyres back to their origin. Further back-tracking of the runway from this
point did not reveal any evidence of tyre marks resulting from braking action
leading into the marks of this first swerve.
The aircraft had deviated first to the right (see Appendix A), with the
right main gear coming within 2 metres of the runway edge. It had then run
diagonally across the runway after swinging left and leaving the runway
extension considerably to the left of the centreline and on a heading slightly to
the right of the runway direction. The aircraft then continued to turn to the right
as it ran across the grass at the end of the runway, breaking several of the
airfield lights at runway 06 end during its progress. It came to rest when it
struck a low earth bank about 300 metres after leaving the runway, 120 meters
to the right of the extended runway centreline and 250 meters from the end of
the runway end on such centreline. The first impact was with the nose-leg,
which collapsed aft and then fractured just above the axle, and the aircraft was
finally halted when the engine intakes struck the bank. There was no evidence
of any braking action during the passage of the aircraft across the grass.
During the swerving portions of the tyre marks, the path of the nosewheels
was always closer to the path of the main-wheel on the inside of the
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curve. This indicated that the aircraft was skidding laterally at those points.
Examination of the tread surface on all tyres showed evidence of severe
abrasion marks in a lateral direction, consistent with sideways slipping of a
freely rolling tyre.
As a result of these first examinations it appeared that there was no
evidence of any braking action occurring at any time during the landing roll
and that the technical investigation focussed on the reason for this.
1.13. Medical and pathological information.
There were no medical factors involved in this accident. Many
passengers experienced minor evacuation injuries from contact with the slides
or from contact with the coarse vegetation surrounding the aircraft's final
stopping location.
1.14. Fire.
Any side of the aircraft or engines did not catch fire. Although the
aircraft was carrying some 7.4 tonnes of fuel, there was no significant fuel
leakage and no fire ensued.
1.15. Survival.
There were no failures of any of the crew or passenger seats on the
aircraft and no disruption of the cabin or flight deck of the aircraft.
From reports by cabin crew members and some of the passengers, it was
apparent that the aircraft's emergency lighting system did not operate initially,
but come on a short time later. Subsequently, no fault could be found with the
operating system.
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Shortly after the aircraft came to a stop, there was apparently smoke or
dust visible in the cabin. Having already sensed the swerving towards the end
of the landing roll, and the rough ride over the terrain in the overrun area, the
cabin crew called to the passengers to adopt the brace position. When the
aircraft stopped, the cabin crew self-initiated their evacuation procedure at the
front initially, followed by the rear cabin. According to cabin crew reports, all
of the passenger and service doors opened normally and each of the slides
inflated automatically and normally.
The cabin crew reported that one of the rear cabin crew members had
tried to make her way up the cabin towards the overwing exit location, but by
that time most of the passengers were standing in the aisle and further progress
was not possible. She attempted to call to the passengers by the overwing exits
to open them, but they did not do so, preferring to join the flow of passengers
to the main door slides. Some passengers also attempted to retrieve hand
luggage from the overhead lockers prior to evacuation.
It was noted that all four of the cover plates for the operating release
handles of the overwing escape hatches had been removed by the passengers
during the evacuation, but none of the hatches had actually been removed.
On leaving the aircraft, the cabin crew attempted to round up the
passengers into a group to await assistance from the airport emergency
services. Some passengers were abusive and unruly during this process.
The airport fire services were apparently on scene within five minutes
of the accident. One female passenger suffered an asthma attack and required
　
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