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selection remained on for 8 samples (32 seconds), it was then deselected for a
further 24 samples (1 minute 36 seconds) before being reselected where it
remained for the rest of the flight.
Appendix D Figure 1 shows the final minute of FDR data covering the
approach and landing from 20 ft AGL to the end. Relevant comments from the
CVR are included. The aircraft touched down at an airspeed of 132 kts CAS, at
a distance calculated to be 2000m from the end of the paved surface. Figure 2
shows the calculated distance and Figure 3 shows the FDR data and relevant
CVR comments plotted against the distance form touchdown.
The Autobrake fault discrete indicated a fault condition as soon as the
aircraft touched down. The ground spoilers and reverse thrust were deployed
less than one second after touchdown. The initial deceleration was –0.18g,
three seconds after touchdown. Around seven seconds after touchdown the
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brake pedal angle position indicated that there was a pilot demand for manual
braking.
Around 20 seconds after touchdown the commander said ‘bit more
braking I should think’. Seven seconds later the first officer said ‘I haven’t got
any brakes’. The maximum brake pedal angle was demanded around 20
seconds after touchdown by which time the longitudinal deceleration had
reduced to –0.09g.
Around 30 seconds after touchdown reverse thrust was de-selected and
then reselected.
The full braking demand continued until the aircraft left the runway 42
seconds after touchdown. The aircraft left the runway with an airspeed of 50
kts, and a groundspeed of 55 kts. The heading was 246° and the aircraft
continued to turn to the right onto a final heading of 350°. The high brake
pedal angle demand was maintained on the right brake, but reduced on the left
brake during the right turn.
The calculated total distance from touchdown to the aircraft stopping
point was 2250 m. As the aircraft came to rest 250 m. beyond the end of the
paved surface, a peak longitudinal deceleration of –1g was recorded.
1.11.2. Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR).
The aircraft was equipped with a Fairchild model A100 re-cycling CVR
which records the latest 30 minutes of audio information on four tracks. The
recording covered the period from the top of descent to landing at Ibiza and
therefore includes the approach. The recording stopped as the aircraft came to
rest and the crew ordered the evacuation.
Because of the limited duration of the recording, the crew actions at the
time of the initial Autobrake LO selection, which occurred around 52 minutes
before touchdown, were not available.
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1.11.3. Post Flight Report (PFR)
In the first hours after the event, attempts were made on board the
aircraft to obtain the Post Flight Report (PFR). However, damage to the nose
landing gear had caused the CFDIU effectively to become locked in 'flight'
mode. Thus it was necessary for the unit to be sent to the aircraft manufacturer
to download the information. The following ECAM Warning messages were
recorded, giving the time the message was logged, the flight phase and an ATA
reference.
GMT PH ATA
2355 06 32-00 BRAKES BSCU CH 2 FAULT (2)
0049 08 32-00 BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT
NOTE: Flight phases 6 and 8 are respectively the cruise and that portion
of the landing phase between touchdown and 80 kts.
The first ECAM warning message displayed to the crew related to the
failure of the No 2 Channel of the BSCU following the Autobrake ‘LO’
selection. The second message was recorded as the aircraft touched down at
00.49 h. and the Normal braking system became unavailable. However, this
was inhibited from display during the landing phase.
The following failure messages were recorded by the CFDIUs:
GMT ATA SOURCE
2355 32-42-34 BSCU BSCU B
2355 32-42-34 BSCU BSCU A
0049 32-42-48 BRK NORM SERVOVALVE 15GG BSCU A
0049 32-42-48 BRK NORM SERVOVALVE 17GG BSCU A
The first message relates to the disagree failure message on Channel 2
(B) and was transmitted to the ECAM as shown above. The second message
shows the disagree failure was present in Channel 1 (A) as well. The second
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message was not displayed on the ECAM; it was indicated only by the "(2)"
data item in the ECAM warning messages on the PFR , this indicated that the
failure affected both channels. The final two messages, which include servo
valve reference numbers, relate to the failure of the BSCU as it attempted to
prepare to apply the desired Autobrake after touchdown.
1.12. Wreckage and impact information.
An inspection of the site, including the second half of the runway,
　
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