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the materials should pass the 60-degree burn test. Consider
only AD'd materials as combustible (i.e. aluminized Mylar,
not all of which will be removed from aircraft).
3) If the aircraft type certificate is pre 1972 then consider solid
materials in an inaccessible zone to be non-combustible if:
a) they are metallic, or
b) they are not present in significant quantities, or
c) they are shown by subsequent analysis to pass the
60 degree burn test.
4) Fluids (hydraulic fluid, fuel, lubricants, corrosion control
compounds) would be considered separately.
Item 3.c, verification of compliance with the current standards, will
often be verifiable by citing continued use of the material on post-
1972-type-certificated aircraft.
[COMMENT 2,also appears throughout report in 4.c.2, 4.f.1, 4.f.2,
5.a.2, 6.a.1, and 6.a.2]
Operators, Airframe Manufacturers, and FAA use an ATA developed
Airworthiness Concerns Coordination process to implement
corrective actions associated with unacceptable airworthiness risks to
the operational fleets. As we have discussed in past ATSRAC
meetings, it is going to be impossible for all parties to agree as to
what exactly defines a material as an unacceptable flammable
material. Any party may initiate an airworthiness concern item to be
8 April 19 2002 4
handled via the ACC process. I would propose that all desired
flammable material removal from any of the operational fleets use
this process. As an example, the metallized mylar insulation used
this process and resulted in an AD to remove the blankets in most
areas of the aircraft over a 5 year period. Each flammable material of
concern should use the same process
OWNER REMARKS: WG9 P1
While there is no specific restriction that prevents consideration of
the presence of flammable material types when accomplishing the
EZAP should an operator choose to do so, EZAP was not designed or
intended to identify tasks to mitigate the risk posed by the presence
of such materials. The FAA took ownership of this question at the
January, 2002, ATSRAC meeting and in March, 2002, published it’s
position that ATSRAC tasking did not include consideration of the
flammability characteristics of uncontaminated materials, nor was
ATSRAC tasked to address the “gap” that is perceived to exist
between current certification standards vs. those used to certify
earlier designs. The FAA essentially concluded that the material
flammability issue will be best addressed by the outcome of R&D
and other efforts currently underway within FAA. T9WG maintains
that use of EZAP to address flammability characteristics of
uncontaminated materials will require the development of an industry
agreed upon list of materials that do not meet current standards. In
regard to pre-vs-post 1972 certification as a means to exclude certain
designs or materials from consideration, this does not address the
certainty of post-1972 modification via STC (or other means) where
FAA surveillance and enforcement of standards may have been less
stringent that on the original aircraft manufacturer.
2e2 WG6/7 Ensure that wiring separation and segregation guidelines that
consider loss of multiple critical functions from a common mode
failure are specified.
WG6 - Task Group 6 has reviewed and discussed this item in the last
Seattle meeting. A FAR requirement similar to JAR 25.1353 (d) is
being considered to be included in the wiring FAR section.
[COMMENT] Please state what this is.
OWNER REMARKS: WG6 P1
A new rule is drafted under sub-part 251705 so that under normal or
failure conditions as defined by 25.1309, it will not adversely affect
the simultaneous operation of any other system necessary for
combined safe flight, landing and egress. Corresponding Advisory
Materials is included in the new wire AC/ACJ for EWIS
2e2 WG7 - Wiring separation and segregation requirements will be
required as SWPM/ESPM minimum content.
[COMMENT] And are generally inadequate. Need to prevent the
SWR 111 (MD-11) wiring scenario from happening again.
OWNER REMARKS: WG7 P1
This comment refers to the HWG7 response to the recommendation
that wire separation and segregation guidelines that consider the loss
of multiple critical functions from a common failure be included as
minimum content in the OEM standard wiring practices manual.
8 April 19 2002 5
While this information is considered to be minimum content HWG7
suspects that the comment relates to the adequacy of these guidelines
in light of recommendations emanating from the TSB.
Wire separation guidelines outlined within the OEM standard wiring
　
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