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meeting Code F requirements should be provided in full on all relevant parts of the movement
area where possible on new constructions or whenever major redevelopment of the
movement area are undertaken. When planning such construction or redevelopment, it may
be prudent to consider the requirements of future aircraft types needing facilities in excess of
Code F.
I.4. Abbreviations
[RP] A14 P3.8.3 = ICAO Recommended Practices Annex 14 Paragraph 3.8.3
[Std] = ICAO Standard
ADM Pt2 = Aerodrome Design Manual part 2
Rwy = Runway
Twy = Taxiway
NLA = New Large Aircraft
CRI = Certification Review Item
FOD = Foreign Object Damage
OPS = Operations
ARFF = Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting
OFZ = Obstacle Free Zone
OLS = Obstacle Limitation Surface
OCP = Obstacle Clearance Panel
IIWG = International Industry Working Group
JAR 25 = Joint Aviation Requirements for Large Aeroplane
JAR AWO = Joint Aviation Requirements All Weather Operations
OCA/H = Obstacle Clearance Altitude/Height
RTO = Rejected Take-Off
WP = Working Paper
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II. Methodology Overview
The methodology that the AACG proposed for establishing operational requirements and
infrastructure needs might be applicable to any type of NLA. In this case, it has been developed
and applied specifically to A380 aircraft (refer to Terms of Reference).
The same simple philosophy (a safety analysis) in four steps has been used for each
infrastructure item that may be affected by the introduction of the A380: runways, taxiways,
runway separations, taxiway separations and other items (refer to Chapter III Airfield Items
Review and Appendix 5 for some more detailed safety analyses).
These four steps are as follows:
·  ICAO baseline identification
·  Hazard analysis
·  Risk assessment
·  Conclusion
II.1. ICAO baseline identification
ICAO baseline identification aims at reviewing ICAO SARPs and ICAO Justification Materials
relating to an infrastructure item.
II.2. Hazard analysis
Hazard analysis applied in this context is the identification of undesirable events and hazards
linked to an infrastructure item using experience and operational judgement.
Analysis has been made:
·  in terms of accident causal factors and critical events with a simple causal analysis, based
on experience and accident data base analyses. The accident information come from
different databases: ICAO (ADREP), FAA (NTSB), aircraft manufacturers (Boeing, Airbus)
and some airlines (see Appendix 1); and
·  in terms of severity with a simple consequences analysis, based on experience and
accident data base analyses
The following risk definitions are derived from JAR - FAR 25.1309 and are used in the
infrastructure item safety analyses to define severity level of the different risks.
Severity level Effect on aircraft and occupants
CATASTROPHIC - Multiple fatalities
- Loss of the airplane
HAZARDOUS - Large reduction in safety margins
- Physical distress or higher workload such that the flight crew cannot be relied
upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely
- Serious or fatal injury to a small number of occupants
MAJOR - Significant reduction in safety margins
- Significant increase in crew workload
- Passenger injuries
MINOR - Slight reduction in safety margins
- Slight increase in crew workload
- Inconvenience to occupants
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Moreover, JAR defines safety objectives based on the principle that there should be an inverse
relationship between the severity of the effect of a failure and the probability of its occurrence
(risk tolerability).
JAR safety objectives are normally confined to aeroplane system failure analysis and not to a
significant event in which all accident factors have been included. Therefore, particular accident
factor rates cannot be simply linked with the global safety target level. A global risk assessment
is most of the time problematic and not always relevant because the (statistically) most
prominent contributor - human factors - is difficult to assess.
These are the reasons why JAR safety objectives have not been considered entirely relevant at
this stage.
AACG members preferred, for most of the infrastructure items, simple qualitative analyses.
Quantitative safety target level and risk models have only been used, at least for the moment, for
specific risks well adapted to modelling.
II.3. Risk assessment
Once each undesirable event is identified and analysed in terms of causes and consequences,
the main remaining question is: “Are all identified risks under control?”
　
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