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such as Company B 454 and
Company B Express 1454 arriving
at the same destination at
the same time.
• For non-air carriers using sequential
tail numbers or transposed
tail numbers (e.g., 58SH/
68SH or 404SH/404HS), a request
for assignment of lessconfusing
but still meaningful
N-numbers might be an option.
Dealing with Conflict
Currently, pilots can go through
channels within their companies to
request changes for numbers that are a
problem. Pilots might also consider
taking this issue to ALPA or ATA, to
bring attention to the situation in an
industry-wide forum. This might encourage
more coordination between
airline companies. Controllers have
the option of talking to their supervisors
about ongoing problems with
similar callsigns, and the supervisors
can take a case to airline representatives.
But there is no promise of action.
Pilots and controllers need to
continue to bring callsign problems to
the attention of management, and as
always, all are encouraged to submit
reports to ASRS. _
Issue Number 8 11
Airport Ramp Safety has been given much attention
recently in reports and papers by a number of
safety organizations. In spite of their efforts, and
those of air carrier safety departments, damage to aircraft
and ground equipment and injury to personnel
continue to occur during ramp operations. A safety
specialist from the United Kingdom Flight Safety
Committee stated the loss in terms almost everyone
can understand: worldwide, the dollar equivalent of
fifteen Boeing 747-400s is lost each year to equipment
damage during ramp operations.1
Since 1986, the Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS) has received more than 370 incident reports
describing equipment damage and personnel injury
during ramp operations.
A detailed study of 182 relevant reports was undertaken
to further identify the major areas of risk in
ramp operations, and the flight crew and ground crew
performance factors that contributed to these events.
To be included in the set of relevant reports, an incident
had to meet each of the following criteria: 1) involve
a ramp operation of an FAR Part 121 or Part 135
aircraft, or a two-crew corporate aircraft; 2) mention
damage to aircraft or ground equipment, or injury to
flight or ground personnel or passengers; and 3) directly
involve the flight crew (that is, the flight crew
occupied the cockpit at the time of the incident, and
their actions or inactions may have contributed to
the incident).
Footnote:
1. This damage estimate was cited in the closing remarks by Harry Hopkins, the former chairman of the United Kingdom Flight
Safety Committee (UKFSC), at the committee’s annual seminar held in November, 1994. The focus of the 1994 seminar was
“Ramp Accidents: The Problem, the Key, and the Cure.”
“AS I was approaching Gate XX, I shut down the #2 engine (per our Ops Manual). I was
momentarily distracted inside the cockpit…When I looked back outside, I saw about four ramp personnel
around one of our gates, so I turned into that gate. One of the ramp personnel jumped up and crossed his
arms, so I stopped the airplane. It was Gate XY, not XX. There was enough room to make a turn to the left to
taxi over to Gate XX. I added power on the #1 engine. I did not notice the power setting, as I was clearing outside
to my left.
During the left turn, the jet blast from the #1 engine blew a mechanic off a maintenance stand. It also blew
part of an engine cowling off the stand.
Perhaps if I had not been so focused outside, I would have been more aware of my power application. In future
situations, I will…shut down and use a tug to reposition if there is any doubt about jet blast.” (#260480)
by Roy Chamberlin, Charles Drew, Marcia Patten, & Robert Matchette
12 Issue Number 8
In contrast, departure operations
tend to be controlled by procedures
and checklists. The flight crew is usually
in radio contact with ATC or company
ramp control before any aircraft
movement begins from the gate. In
addition, there is more likely to be
verbal communication with the
ground crew during the early segments
of a departure procedure. In
spite of increased levels of communication,
a misunderstanding placed the
next crew’s 747 in the path of another
747, causing damage to both aircraft:
✍ “We were cleared to push after Airline
A taxied by. We began pushback after an
Airline A DC-10 passed by, but Ground
Control said ‘Not that one, the B-727.’
　
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