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“visual” separation. Consider the following controller
report:
“I was training a developmental [controller] on
Arrival Control. We had an air taxi (X) for
sequence to visual approach Runway 15. The
developmental pointed out aircraft (Y) [to air taxi
(X)] and the pilot responded, ‘Is he following
someone out there at 800 feet? ’ The developmental
was going to clear him for the visual approach
when I stopped him and asked [the pilot
of air taxi (X)]…if he had aircraft (Y) in sight. He
said not visually, but had him on TCAS II. This
seems to be happening more and more…It
appears [that pilots]…are using TCAS II instead
of looking out the window. As an air traffic
controller I cannot have pilots using TCAS for
visual separation to maintain spacing (as on one
occurrence a crew offered to do). There is no
TCAS II separation.” (ACN 202301)
TCAS II-Induced Conflicts
Many TCAS incident reports received at the ASRS allege that pilot
response to erroneous TCAS commands has promoted a conflict
where, initially, none existed. Consider the following near mid-air
collision (NMAC) where the TCAS II RA may well have been
triggered by the high climb rate of air carrier (Y).
A Controller’s Dilemma
“Air carrier (X) was inbound on the…STAR level at 10,000 feet.
Under my control, air carrier (Y) departed…on the…SID, climbing
to [an] assigned altitude of 9,000 feet. Approximately 14 miles
SW…I issued traffic to air carrier (X) that air carrier (Y) was
leveling at 9,000. Air carrier (X) responded after a few seconds that
they were descending. I again told air carrier (X) to maintain
10,000 feet. Air carrier (X) responded ‘OK, we’ve got an alert saying
go down.’
“Simultaneously, air carrier (Y) was getting an alert to climb. They
both followed the TCAS II [RAs] and almost collided. Later, [the
pilot of air carrier (X)]…indicated [that] his TCAS II was showing
zero separation. They passed in the clouds without seeing each
other. When pilots start taking evasive action, our equipment cannot
update quickly enough for the controller to help. Both aircraft were
issued traffic as prescribed by our handbook (merging target
procedures). [Air carrier] Company directives, I’m told, dictate that
pilots must respond/follow the TCAS II alert advisories.” (ACN
224796)
The Captain of Air Carrier (X)
“[We] air carrier (X) received a Traffic Advisory [TA] annunciation
followed by [an] immediate RA annunciation…‘Descend Crossing
Descend.’ We immediately pushed over following the RA to 2,000 to
2,500 foot per minute descent. Intruder was showing 12 to 12:30,
800 feet below [and] climbing. I instructed the First Officer to
advise ATC of [the] descent. ATC advised [the] intruder was [an] air
carrier who was on a different frequency…and that he was leveling
off. [The] Controller advised us to level and then climb. Both
aircraft passed to each others’ right on the same altitude. During
the event things got confusing. [The] RA called for descent and then
increased descent. ATC is calling for a level-off followed by an
immediate climb.” (ACN 224912)
The Controller of Air Carrier(Y) Writes…
“[A] pilot can now disregard ATC instructions based on TCAS II
alerts, even if the controller has issued traffic to that aircraft and
has applied the correct separation.” (ACN 224982)
Issue Number 4 7
Pilot/Controller Conflict
In a recent congressional subcommittee hearing on TCAS II, Air
Line Pilots Association (ALPA) President, J. Randolph Babbitt,
testified, “Line pilots have strongly endorsed TCAS II and would
emphatically resist any efforts to reduce its operational effectiveness.”
The National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA)
President, Barry Krasner, countered at the same hearing that
“...TCAS [II] is highly disruptive to the air traffic control environment.”
The U.S. Government’s General Accounting Office, in a
summary of TCAS II surveys, detected that controllers have strong
“negative” feelings while there is widespread pilot acceptance of
TCAS II.
The pilot community, particularly ALPA, sees TCAS II as a “...last
ditch, they-may-have-hit-if-something-is-not-done, piece of equipment...”
that gives the pilot a precious way out if “...the ATC system
has somehow unaccountably failed.” Both the FAA and the airlines
exhort TCAS II equipped flight crews to “...follow the RA...” when it
　
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