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within five [minutes] to seven minutes.”3
The following excerpts from emergency-water-landing
descriptions were among several cited in a 1998 study for
the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).1 The
accident-investigation narratives were considered in
developing the study’s findings on cabin-crew training:
• “The passengers were all seated with lap belts on, trays
stowed and seat backs upright as the senior flight
attendant was preparing to read the standard prelanding
announcement. There were no warnings or changes in
aircraft [attitude] or power before impact. Passengers
interviewed after the crash believed the severity of the
impact [could] be categorized as, ‘hitting very hard on
land.’ Most [passengers] reported that they were thrown
forward and/or downward. Those seated near the wing
and to the rear said that they either smelled, tasted or
were struck by jet fuel immediately after impact.
Passengers were very concerned about the possibility
of a fire, although no postcrash fire occurred. There was
a ‘gush’ of water into the airplane, and the water began
to rise very fast. Some of the injured were trapped in
their seats by the rising water.
“The passengers evacuated the cabin as the aircraft
settled tail first in the shallow water. Three overwing exits
were opened by passengers. The two forward, floor-level
doors were opened by the crew after numerous
problems. One man escaped by opening the aft-right
emergency door. The senior flight attendant tried to pull
the slide-inflation handle at the forward passenger door,
but she could not find it. She thought [that] the slide
pack may have separated from the girt bar, so she
abandoned her effort to find it. She grabbed a
megaphone and began giving orders, ‘Get your life vest
from under your seats and come forward.’ The crew
assisted passengers with the life vests, because many
were having difficulties finding and using them. The
aircraft was not equipped with (nor was it required to
carry) approved flotation-seat cushions or life rafts. Life
vests were located under the passenger seats, although
42 percent of the passengers later stated [that] they had
not seen the life-vest demonstration, and 59 percent of
the passengers admitted [that] they had not read the
briefing card [during] this trip.
“Many passengers were unaware that [life] vests were
contained in plastic bags located in fabric compartments
under their seats. Several tried to use their seat cushions
as flotation devices, but found that they came apart [in
water] and/or were not buoyant. Those [passengers] who
did secure their life vest[s] had various problems with
the straps [and] donning the vest[s], and they had never
seen the light on a life vest demonstrated. The accident
investigation report [said] that 72 percent of the
passengers needed specific or direct assistance in the
1 0 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • CABIN CREW SAFETY • NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1998
[This accident occurred on Feb. 28, 1984 at about 1618
local time following an approach to Runway 4R at John
F. Kennedy International Airport (Jamaica, New York,
U.S.), when Scandinavian Airlines System Flight 901,
a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30, touched down about
4,700 feet (1,432 meters) beyond the threshold of the
8,400-foot (2,560-meter) runway and could not be
stopped on the runway. The airplane was steered to
the right to avoid the approach-light pier at the
departure end of the runway and came to rest in
Thurston Basin, a tidal waterway located about 600
feet [183 meters] from the departure end of Runway
4R. The 163 passengers and 14 crewmembers
evacuated the aircraft safely; two flight crewmembers
and one cabin crewmember received minor injuries;
one passenger was classified as a serious injury
(hospitalized for observation because of a cardiac
condition); and eight passengers received minor
injuries. The aircraft was damaged substantially. The
weather was ceiling 200 feet overcast, visibility 3/4 mile
with light drizzle and fog, and wind from 100 degrees
at five knots. The NTSB said in its final report that the
probable cause of the accident was the flight crew’s
disregard for prescribed procedures for monitoring and
controlling airspeed during the final stages of the
approach, decision to continue the landing rather than
to execute a missed approach, and overreliance on the
autothrottle speed-control system, which had a history
of recent malfunctions.]
• “Immediately following the impact, the captain verbally
　
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