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performed the passenger-evacuation checklist. The
captain, the first officer, an off-duty … captain, flight
attendants and an airport police officer (who jumped
into the water from the runway deck) assisted the
passengers in [the] evacuation. A flight attendant
deployed the evacuation slide at R-1; the R-2 slide was
disarmed before the door was opened because the flight
attendant believed that the slide would float upward and
block the exit because of the closeness of the water.
The L-2 door was opened and then closed when water
entered the cabin. Depending upon where the
passengers were seated, their evacuations were
impeded by darkness, cabin separations at seat [row] 4
and [seat row] 21, and unusable floor-level exits on the
left side.
“About 20 passengers were able to successfully
evacuate through the left-overwing exits and stand on
the wing, which was out of the water. Someone unstowed
the fabric ditching line from above a left-overwing exit
and tied [the line] to [the] wing fitting, providing these
passenger[s] something to hold on to while awaiting
rescue. The ditching line was also unstowed from the
right overwing exit opening, but evacuees did not know
[that] it needed to be tied to the right-wing fitting. The
forward portion of the right wing was out of the water
and passengers held on to the ditching line so [that]
they could stay out of the water.
“Passengers who egressed at the two floor-level exits
entered the water and, because of the one-knot current,
some [occupants] drifted away from the airplane and
under the runway deck. Crewmembers threw flotationseat
cushions and crew life preservers, which were held
by passengers and crewmembers, some of whom could
not swim. Several [people] complained that they could
not hold on to the cushions or that the cushions did not
keep them afloat. Some clung to pilings under the deck
and floating debris. Some passengers also swallowed
fuel that was on the surface of the water. There was no
fire.
“The first rescue boat … arrived approximately 10
minutes after the accident; it was joined shortly by U.S.
Coast Guard boats, boats from other agencies, and two
[U.S.] Coast Guard helicopters. Several of the
passengers complained that waves from boats and
downwash from the rescue helicopters hampered [their]
ability to stay afloat. One passenger sustained a
fractured right ankle and a lacerated hand when a rescue
boat backed over her in the darkness. The captain and
the lead flight attendant were the last crewmembers to
leave the cabin after assisting rescue workers, who were
attempting to extricate passengers trapped in [seat] 21F
and [seat] 22A. According to U.S. Coast Guard records,
all [occupants] were removed from the aircraft within 90
minutes. …
“It should also be noted that although crewmembers
had life preservers, FAA regulations did not require life
preservers for passengers aboard this flight. Also,
because it was not required by the FAA, flight
attendants had not received hands-on ditching training
in water.”4
[This accident occurred on Sept. 20, 1989 at about 2321
local time when the flight crew of USAir Flight 5050, a
Boeing 737-400, rejected a takeoff on Runway 31 at
LaGuardia Airport (Flushing, New York, U.S.), but did
not stop the aircraft before the aircraft left the runway
and struck Bowery Bay. During the takeoff, the first officer
(pilot flying) felt the aircraft drift left, and as the takeoff
run progressed, the flight crew heard a “bang” and a
continual rumbling noise. The captain took over and
rejected the takeoff. Two passengers were killed; both
pilots and the four cabin crewmembers received minor
injuries; and 15 of 57 passengers were injured. The
aircraft was destroyed. The weather was estimated
ceiling 500 feet overcast, visibility five miles, light rain
and fog, and wind from 210 degrees at four knots. The
NTSB said in its final report that the probable cause of
the accident was the captain’s failure to exercise his
command authority in a timely manner to reject the
takeoff or to take sufficient control to continue the takeoff,
which was initiated with a mistrimmed rudder. Also
causal was the captain’s failure to detect the mistrimmed
rudder before the takeoff was attempted, said the
report.]©
FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • CABIN CREW SAFETY • NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1998 11
References
1. Cosper, Donna K.; McLean, Garnet A. Analysis of
Ditching and Water Survival Training Programs of Major
　
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