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currently provides digital publication services to more than 25 major aerospace organizations, both
military and commercial, on five different continents. Over 40,000 aerospace technicians now rely on
Jouve AirGTI technology for access to critical repair and maintenance information. For more information
on JAS, please visit www.jouve.com.
ABOUT AIRGTI
AirGTI is not just a computer system, but represents a way of doing aeronautical business and
has simplified the way that aviation publications are managed. By gaining control of its data, an
operator can increase productivity and reduce the cost of change management. Maintaining the
quality, accuracy, and reliability of data are essential in the achievement of operational
excellence. In today's value-conscious environment where we must do "more with less" in a
method faster and better than the competition, a comprehensive data integrity management
solution is imperative. The AirGTI Suite and AirGTI Services provide this by merging
specialized knowledge and experience with airline business process automation and technology.
The synergy that results from this combination is what makes the AirGTI solution so powerful,
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strategy.
# # #
m e m o i r s
f r o m m y l o g b o o k
by John L ange
IN THE remarkable evolution of aviation
since the Wright brothers first
contrived to become airborne in a
machine heavier than the atmosphere, man
has been inspired to pursue, passionately
and relentlessly, the attainment of greater
safety in the air, continually producing bigger,
better, more efficient and safer passenger
aircraft.
The introduction of the Boeing 747 among
others, into general airline service in the late
1960s and early 1970s, heralded new standards
of safety.
However, even as that gigantic aircraft was
taking shape on the drawing boards, designers
were becoming increasingly aware that despite
the fact that technology had virtually eliminated
the time-honoured causes of accidents such
as mechanical failure, design faults or weather,
the human element was rapidly becoming the
major factor in such accidents, as few and far
between as they may have become.
Boeing having recognised this, therefore
sought to produce an aircraft as near fool
proof as the technology of the day could make
it, thankfully, however, without compromising
the over-riding capability of the pilot. Despite
its shortcomings, the human brain, with its
ability to judge, assess and anticipate, cannot
be transcended by any computer.
Later, other manufacturers were to learn
the folly of according so much authority to
auto systems that, in fact, they actually began
to over-ride the pilot! This was amply demonstrated
by the tragic series of accidents to
Airbus Industrie's A320, the world’s first civil
'fly by wire' or virtually fully computer controlled
aircraft in the early1990s, whereby all
inputs from the pilot are fed to a computer
which then manipulates the control surfaces,
thus eliminating the “feel” that is so important
during manual control.
One consequence of this is that, more than
ever before, crew co-operation and cross monitoring
on the flight deck became vital to safety,
for as sophisticated as any auto flight system
may become, like any computer, the right
buttons still have to be pressed for it to function
properly.
Prior to this, the early 1970s saw a reappraisal
of the approach to airline pilot selection
and training, following several horrendous
accidents directly related to the atmosphere
engendered by some captains on the flight deck.
One of the first of these to awaken this realisation,
occurred in 1972 when a British
European Airways’ (later to be incorporated
into British Airways) three-engined Trident
stalled shortly after taking off from London's
Heathrow Airport to crash into the ground at
Staines, tragically, with no survivors.
It subsequently emerged that during the
pre-flight formalities, the highly experienced,
very senior, but intractable, captain had apparently
had an infernal row with his two young,
relatively inexperienced, first officers, leading
to an extremely strained atmosphere on the
flight deck. After takeoff, inexplicably before
attaining sufficient speed, the leading edge lift
devices were retracted.
On large jets, such devices can reduce
　
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