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guidance had not specifically focused
on nonalerted in-flight cabin fires — fires
for which there is no automatic warning
system to provide an alert to the crew,”
he said. “These fires typically occur in
the aircraft’s sidewall, overhead areas
or other inaccessible areas of the cabin.
Smoke/fire/fumes in this context has been
a difficult issue to address partly because it
is driven by the aircraft configuration, how
a particular operator uses the aircraft and
the purpose of the aircraft relative to the
operator’s use.”
Source identification, access to the fire and
immediate landing become the overriding
concerns when a hidden fire occurs.
“Source identification is critical and may
be as simple as locating a hot spot on
the aircraft’s interior or the presence of
smoke within the cabin,” Jenkins said.
“Nevertheless, crewmembers may not see
the smoke because environmental control
systems exchange air very rapidly during
flight. Their sense of smell may become the
primary detector. Access also can be very
difficult because airframes typically are not
designed with fire fighting access points,
except for certain controlled areas. For
different aircraft, there are different methods
of accessing hidden areas and crews
must be aggressive and creative to gain
access to the fire. Each operator should
understand the configuration design of its
aircraft and provide information about access
to their crews.”
Development of the template for checklist
authors at aircraft manufacturers and air
carriers complements concepts of cabin
crew training that were addressed in AC
120-80, he said.
“How a template eventually will be integrated
into a U.S. air carrier’s system will be left up
to the particular carrier,” Jenkins said.
FAA continues to encourage input to the
AC from the industry, individuals and other
regulatory bodies, he said. Future revisions
to AC 120-80 will be subject to the normal
due-diligence processes. ■
— FSF Editorial Staff
Notes
1. Jenkins, Daniel. Interview by
Rosenkrans, Wayne. Herndon,
Virginia, U.S. March 11, 2005. Flight
Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
Virginia, U.S.
2. Transportation Safety Board
of Canada (TSB). Aviation
Investigation Report no.
A98H0003, In-flight Fire Leading
to Collision with Water, Swissair
Transport Limited, McDonnell
Douglas MD-11, HB-IWF, Peggy’s
Cove, Nova Scotia 5 nm SW, 2
September 1998. At 2018 local
time on Sept. 2, 1998, Swissair
Flight 111 struck the ocean about
5.0 nautical miles (9.3 kilometers)
southwest of Peggy’s Cove,
Nova Scotia, Canada, while the
crew was diverting to Halifax
International Airport, Nova Scotia,
after an abnormal odor, smoke and
fire progressively were detected in
the cockpit. The 215 passengers
and 14 crewmembers were
killed; the aircraft was destroyed.
TSB, in its final report, said that
causes and contributing factors
included inadequate aircraft
certification standards for material
flammability; flammable cover
material on acoustic insulation
blankets; flame-propagation
characteristics of thermal acoustic
insulation cover materials; silicone
elastomeric end caps, hook-andloop
fasteners, foams, adhesives
and thermal acoustic insulation
splicing tapes that contributed
to the propagation and intensity
of the in-flight fire; and circuit
breakers, similar to those in
general aircraft use, that were not
capable of protecting against all
types of wire arcing events. “The
fire most likely started from a wire
arcing event,” TSB said.
FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • JUNE 2005 37
Between the third quarter of 2000 and
the first quarter of 2005, the New
Zealand civil aviation accident rate
(based on a 10-year moving average)
decreased signifi cantly for airplanes with maximum
takeoff weights between 5,670 kilograms
and 13,608 kilograms (12,500 pounds and 30,000
pounds) carrying revenue passengers and freight
(Figure 1, page 38).1, 2 The rate for the period was
below the 2005 target, set by the Civil Aviation
Authority of New Zealand (CAA), of 0.5 accidents
per 100,000 fl ight hours. The equivalent accident
rate for airplanes 13,608 kilograms and greater
decreased slightly for the period and was below
the CAA 2005 target of 0.4 accidents per 100,000
fl ight hours (Figure 2, page 38).
　
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