曝光臺 注意防騙 網(wǎng)曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費(fèi)者

team!

... Installation of the new tire was completed
without the spacer ring causing the tire, wheel, and
brake assembly to be damaged beyond repair. The
men changing this tire failed to use proper
procedures in the manual and never checked for the
spacer ring.

... I may have inadvertently left the spacers out of
the installation of the new tire and wheel assembly.
I do not believe that the spacers were originally
there. I followed the maintenance manual card
which states that there should be a maximum of two
to three threads showing. This thread count is
maintained even with the spacer missing.

... I conferred with the other mechanic and we
both agreed that the tire was installed properly.
When the aircraft landed at its next destination, the
brake on this wheel assembly overheated and the
tire deflated... It was noted that the inboard spacer
was missing from the assembly... While I had a copy
of the maintenance manual, I referred to it only for
torque values. I didn't look for this inboard spacer
because I wasn't aware of it.
The Maintenance Desk
Several recent ASRS maintenance reports have
indicated a recurring problem regarding failure to
install B767 wheel spacers. In some instances, it
appears that the wheel spacer adheres to the
grease on the inboard side of the wheel and is
removed with the old assembly. Refer to the B767
Maintenance Manual for wheel spacer installation
procedures.

On approach to Runway 31, I let my First Officer get
high. When I finally reached for the gear handle, he called
for gear down (good decision, but too late). At
approximately three miles out, I realized that we might not
make it down, so I asked for S-turns (good decision). Tower
said he had traffic to the left so I then asked for a right
360- degree turn (excellent decision). My First Officer said
that he still thought we could make it. I then told Tower we
would continue the approach (bad decision). At 1000 feet
we were not within parameters, so I elected to go around
(excellent decision). The controller offered Runway 22, so
we entered a left downwind (bad idea). We turned base
and overshot Runway 22L and were given a vector to
Runway 31 where a normal approach and landing was
made. Reaching the gate, I made a PA and told the
passengers that we had been too high to make a safe
landing so we had elected to go around…
This was the second leg of my first Captain trip. It was the
first non-flying leg without a check airman. My First
Officer was an experienced pilot with twenty years
experience flying airliners. I believe that I let his
experience influence my decision to continue the approach.
I shouldn’t have let my First Officer get high and shouldn’t
have accepted Runway 22L from such a tight downwind. I
also should have made the PA while on downwind to
Runway 31… In the future I will never let anyone’s
experience lull me into a decision that I am not
comfortable with… A good decision was made to go
around, but I never should have had to make that call.
In this report to ASRS, a junior B737 Captain who “knew
better” was led astray by voices of experience. The
Captain’s parenthetical remarks voice a step-by-step
critique of the incident.
Command Decisions
Hitting the Spot

The instructor…told me to…execute a spot landing on
the second stripe of the runway centerline. Abeam the
numbers …I reached forward to the place where the
landing gear switch is found on [my type aircraft], but
where the cowl flaps control is located on this type aircraft.
I closed the cowl flaps, but before I reached for the landing
gear switch, the instructor startled me by switching the
radio back to…Approach. He informed Approach that we
were remaining in the pattern. I switched back to CTAF
and announced our position. I proceeded to “complete” the
[landing] check… turned final, and adjusted power to
ensure that we would touch down on the designated spot. I
fixated on the spot landing target and failed to make my
customary recheck of “three green…” Evidently, the
instructor distracted himself as well when he made the
radio call…because he did not catch my failure to lower
the gear abeam the numbers. He also must have fixated on
the spot-landing target… The airplane’s gear up warning
horn was inoperative and did not sound. The prop struck
the runway as the belly settled onto the second stripe of the
centerline… The sound of metal striking concrete was
　
中國航空網(wǎng) www.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：CALL BACK 2(22)