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that required an evasive maneuver.
■ [I was] working Local Control North with three aircraft
inbound from the northwest, all VFR. Local Control South
coordinated a northwest departure for a Piper, VFR. When
I approved the northwest turn for the Piper, all of my
aircraft inbound from the northwest were abeam the Piper
“The horn, the horn, the lusty horn,
Is not a thing to laugh to scorn.”
William Shakespeare
As You Like It. Act IV. Sc. 2.
In the next report, a student pilot and a flight instructor
in a Cessna 182 RG learned a hard lesson about checklists
and distractions. The instructor also shared a sound
lesson about audible warnings.
From the student pilot’s report:
■ I interrupted the landing checklist to report mid-field,
downwind. My instructor then pulled back the throttle and
told me to set up for an emergency landing on the runway.
I did not return to the checklist, but immediately began
calculating distance to the runway and best airspeed.
While my instructor guided me, I set up on final approach
and flared only to hear and feel the tail strike the ground,
followed quickly by the rest of the aircraft. The prop struck
several times and the engine stopped….
I have learned that every landing requires full attention….
Checklists are the only way to make sure that nothing has
been missed and, once begun, each checklist must be
completed….
From the flight instructor’s report:
I planned on simulating an engine failure after my student
started the landing checklist at the point where he would
have lowered the landing gear. My student made a position
report, however, at mid-field, downwind where I had
expected him to lower the landing gear. Without thinking
further, I simulated the failed engine by reducing the
throttle to idle. While supervising the emergency
procedure, I was also critiquing the flight path my student
was taking…. I had not noticed that my student had
skipped half of the landing checklist and I did not doublecheck
the gear extension, as I normally would have. I also
did not notice the audible gear warning horn….
and at 2,500 feet. The Piper was leaving 2,600 feet before
he turned. I saw the Piper’s target on the D-BRITE
(Digital Bright Radar Indicator Tower Equipment)
heading northeast at 2,400 feet. I asked the Piper to report
his altitude…and looked out the window to see if he was in
conflict with any of the inbound traffic. I saw him just as
he dove to miss one of the aircraft…. The [instructor pilot
in the] Piper said that he pulled an engine on the student
as they turned northwest, causing the aircraft to turn
northeast and descend….
Visit the ASRS Booth in the NASA
Hangar at EAA AirVenture 2003.
CCAALLLLBBAACCKK From NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System
Number 287 August 2003
A Monthly Safety Bulletin
from
The Office of the NASA
Aviation Safety Reporting
System,
P.O. Box 189,
Moffett Field, CA
94035-0189
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/
July 2003 Report Intake
Air Carrier / Air Taxi Pilots 1993
General Aviation Pilots 811
Controllers 40
Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 164
TOTAL 3008
ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On…
The Lowdown on Visual Approaches: Back Them Up
Many pilots consider
visual approaches to be
less demanding than
instrument approaches
flown in poor weather
conditions. But visual
approaches can present
a number of hazards,
particularly when
localizer and glide slope
indications are not used to backup visual
impressions.
As these pilots reported to ASRS, a low altitude
alert can be an unexpected reminder to get “back
up” on the proper visual approach path.
Drifting in a Haze
A controller’s warning confirmed that this MD-88 flight
crew should have relied more on what the instruments
indicated than on what they thought they saw outside.
■ We were asked to report the field in sight for a visual
approach to Runway 12R. The First Officer stated that he
saw the field ahead and we accepted the visual approach.
Conditions were very hazy and I thought I saw the field,
however the localizer showed that we were right of course.
I felt that we were on a shallow intercept and opted to
maintain this intercept (due to Runway 12L traffic, which
I had visually). As we continued what appeared to be a
normal, visual descent, I noted that we were drifting
further below glide slope and not closing on the localizer
　
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