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to return to the previous frequency. We were out of range of
that frequency. It took approximately five minutes to get on
the right frequency. In the meantime, we crossed INTXN at
FL240 instead of the published instructions to expect
10,000 feet. We were given descent vectors to rejoin the
arrival....
If you have ever wondered just who the folks are that
process and analyze the thousands of reports sent to
ASRS every month, we invite you to meet the staff in this
and subsequent issues of CALLBACK.
CCAALLLLBBAACCKK From NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System
A Monthly Safety Bulletin
from
The Office of the NASA
Aviation Safety Reporting
System,
P.O. Box 189,
Moffett Field, CA
94035-0189
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/
September 2005 Report Intake
Air Carrier / Air Taxi Pilots 2247
General Aviation Pilots 823
Controllers 104
Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 179
TOTAL 3353
Number 313 November 2005
ASRS Alerts Issued in September 2005
Subject of Alert No. of Alerts
Aircraft or aircraft equipment 8
Airport facility or procedure 9
ATC procedure or equipment 7
Company policy or maintenance procedure 3
Total 27
While a broad range of communication issues are
commonly cited in incidents reported to ASRS, the
following reports focus on a single issue– the effect
of non-standard situations on personnel whose
English may be limited to “standard” aviation
terminology.
People with a limited command of English often
rely upon the context of the situation to aid their
understanding and to prompt their use of certain
phraseology. As noted in the following reports, a
change in the normal sequence of events can result
in a potentially dangerous miscommunication.
On a Roll
When language factors detract from precise
communications, it is vital to clear up any ambiguity
before acting. This B757 crew’s experience at a foreign
airport was a case in point that led to some “sound”
advice.
■ Engine start was uneventful until the after start flows
were accomplished. At that point we experienced a problem
with the left bleed air valve…. The MEL (Minimum
Equipment List) showed this as a “return to gate” item. At
this point, I told the mechanic we needed to be towed back
in. His response sounded like he was asking us to release
the parking brake; however, neither of us quite understood
what he had said about the brakes. I asked him if he was
asking us to release the parking brake, to which he
responded, “Release parking brake.” I released the parking
brake and the tug operation commenced.
With the tug operation underway, I turned my attention
towards the logbook, thinking about how I was going to
write up this problem. The First Officer…was looking over
the MEL…. What seemed like a few seconds after we began
to be tugged, the First Officer asked, “Where is this guy
taking us?” I looked up I saw the end of the paved ramp
approaching rapidly and heard the First Officer say
something about stopping the aircraft. At that point we
were both simultaneously on the brakes…. After leaving
about 20 feet of skid marks on the ramp, the aircraft came
to a stop with the nose wheel approximately eight feet from
the end of the paved surface... without the tug connected!
When the aircraft was stopped and the engines shut down,
my next concern was the location of the mechanic and
whether he was okay. He was.
Although this mechanic speaks fairly good English, I was
truly surprised at the level of communication breakdown
that had just occurred…. The mechanic told me he thought
I was telling him that I was releasing the parking brake.
Once we started rolling he did not tell us to stop, but
instead simply unplugged his headset and got out of the
way.
What lessons can be learned or relearned from all of this?
First of all this is a reminder of something we all know,
that being towed is an operation which requires someone
to be monitoring the aircraft. Secondly, never assume
anything. Since we never saw the tug pull away (it pulled
away while we were in the books) and we were told to
release the parking brake, we thought we were under
tow….
During approach briefings, simulator training, and line
non-normal operations flight, someone is always assigned
the task of monitoring the aircraft. Let this serve as a
reminder to do the same during tow operations.
Thank goodness no one was hurt, no metal was bent, and
　
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