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flying enter the new altitude in the FMS Cruise Altitude
page and then push the VNAV button. We both became
distracted for a couple of minutes and then ATC radioed a
repeat of our clearance. We realized that the aircraft had
not begun to descend as programmed…. We re-learned a
lesson— it’s easy to become complacent with the
automation.

We were given a descent clearance from FL380 to cross
FIX at FL350. The auto-pilot was engaged and
programmed for the descent. By the time we realized that
the aircraft had not started the descent, it was too late to
make the crossing restriction…. Lesson learned: you
still have to keep an eye on the airplane.

After leveling off at our cruise altitude, we were
assigned a 290- degree heading to intercept the INTXN
transition…. The auto-pilot was engaged and heading
mode was active on the flight director. The heading bug
was set to 290 degrees and the NAV capture button was
pressed and illuminated to enable intercept of the course
toward INTXN. A brief discussion about the approach
charts ensued and ended with ATC advising us that we
had passed through the INTXN transition…. For some
reason the flight director did not capture and intercept the
commanded course…. We both should have been
monitoring the intercept…. It is very important to
stay alert.

On descent, Center gave us clearance to cross FIX at
8,000 feet. The First Officer (pilot flying) used LVL CHG
(Level Change) to select it and I visually confirmed this. I
then looked away to continue filing a report in the ACARS.
I believe the First Officer was putting away some of his
charts. Then he made a comment that alluded to the fact
that the airplane wasn’t doing what he asked to do. It was
only descending at 500 feet per minute. By the time he
caught this and corrected for it, we were going to miss the
altitude restriction. I notified Center and they were not too
pleased…. Make sure the autoflight system is doing
what you want it to do.
Automation
Complacency
CCAALLLLBBAACCKK From NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System
Number 308 May 2005
Back to the Basics
A Monthly Safety Bulletin
from
The Office of the NASA
Aviation Safety Reporting
System,
P.O. Box 189,
Moffett Field, CA
94035-0189
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/
ASRS Alerts Issued in April 2005 April 2005 Report Intake
Air Carrier / Air Taxi Pilots 2517
General Aviation Pilots 849
Controllers 39
Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 144
TOTAL 3549
Subject of Alert No. of Alerts
Aircraft or aircraft equipment 5
Airport facility or procedure 1
ATC procedure or equipment 4
Chart or Publication 1
Total 11
Many aviation accidents
and incidents are the direct
result of not using basic
skills and procedures
learned as a student pilot.
Just as in many athletic
activities, flying proficiency
is dependent upon
mastering a core set of
basic skills. It is only after
these fundamentals become second nature that the
finer points can be addressed. But professionals
also recognize that the basics are more than a
foundation for greater proficiency. In aviation,
where the consequences of neglecting the basics
can be severe, these fundamental priciples must be
incorporated as ongoing, integral aspects of the
profession.
In sports, the losing coach’s lament, “We need to get
back to basics and focus on the fundamentals,” is
heard so often that it has become a cliché. As the
following ASRS reports show, the same sentiment is
also expressed in aviation.
Preflight Basics
A thorough preflight is fundamental to a safe and
successful flight. As this E145 Captain found, a thorough
(and persistent) preflight can save the day when another
member of the team forgets the basics.
■ On preflight... there was something visible in the left
logo light area. We requested maintenance to check it out.
Maintenance told us that there was nothing wrong, that it
was just the logo light housing. I have done numerous
preflights and had never seen this before. I demanded that
a lift be used to inspect the area. A maintenance technician
and I went to the top of the tail where we found a bucking
bar used for riveting. Who knows how long this tool was
there. If it got lodged in the control cables, a fatal accident
could have occurred. The tool could have been left there
from manufacturing, but I doubt it. There were no
identifying marks on it. Our maintenance and quality
　
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