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6.2 Ambiguity
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As this paper has revealed, ambiguity can arise from many aspects of verbal
communications. It has been implicated in many aviation accidents such as the 1992
Air Inter Flight 148 crash on Mont Sainte-Odile in France which killed 87 people
where, because of the use of “less-than-optimum phraseology by both the flight crew
and the controller, their respective intentions and expectations were ambiguous”.
This led to a sudden workload peak for the crew just prior to the crash (Pariès, 1996).
Workload may increase vagueness and imprecision. Vague vernacular, such as jargon
and acronyms, may confuse pilots or controllers. Vagueness is also a social
affectation, considered polite when addressing superiors, but it may also restrict the
flow of information between ATC team members, reducing situational awareness
(Morrow and Rodvold, 1998). Vagueness is often associated with trainee controllers
and disappears with experience (pers. obs.).
Words with uncertain reference, such as the pronouns ‘him’ or ‘it’ or indefinite nouns
such as ‘things’, may be ambiguous and can cause confusion, as we saw in the Florida
Everglades crash in 1972.
A lack of definition can also be included here when controllers and pilots have
differing understandings of words and procedures. Gero (1996) provides an example.
In 1974 a Boeing 727 approaching Dulles Airport, Washington, was “cleared for a
VOR/DME approach” which the pilot understood to mean he was cleared to the final
approach altitude of 1800 feet and that there was no other terrain above that level on
his route. The controller understood it to mean that the aircraft could descend without
conflicting with other traffic and that the pilot was responsible for terrain avoidance.
The aircraft crashed into a mountain. The subsequent inquiry found that there was
confusion by both pilots and controllers regarding each other’s responsibilities;
everyone simply made their own interpretation. It found that pilots were often unsure
of the type of radar service they were receiving. Twenty-five years later Airservices
Australia is still encountering the problem:
Pilots must be aware that the responsibility has shifted from the controller to them and
is therefore incumbent on the controller to use standard phraseologies to ensure that
pilots are in no doubt. (Airservices Australia, 1997a)
6.3 Callsign Confusion
Aircraft callsign confusion is a vexation throughout the world. It hampered ATC
assistance to the charter DC-8 with an in-flight fire at Jeddah in 1991 which killed
261 people (Flight Safety Foundation, 1993), was implicated in the Boeing B737 and
Metroliner collision in Los Angeles in 1991 (Maurino, Reason, Johnston and Lee,
1995), and has caused numerous other incidents when pilots have accepted clearances
meant for others. There have been calls in the UK and North America for a central
system for controlling the allocation of callsigns (Job, 1997, Canadian Aviation
Safety Board, 1990). One recent Confidential Aviation Incident Report (CAIR)
complained that the following aircraft were on the same frequency: New Zealand 88,
Qantas 28, Qantas 88, Qantas 188, All Nippon 828 and All Nippon 888 (BASI,
1998b). The writer complained of several mistakes on the radio. (Apparently the
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number ‘8’ has significance in the Asian market—another example of how culture
may impinge on aviation safety).
There has been a continuing trial of flight number callsigns in Australia. Job (1997)
has argued against its acceptance due to the potential for confusion. Registration
callsigns have 26 possible last letters whereas numbers have only 10. Also, he writes,
crews become familiar with their registration callsign during a flight, but a flight
number changes every leg. Following feedback from the industry, the flight number
element of the callsign has recently been reduced from 4 digits to 2 for domestic
flights. In my experience, registration callsigns play a significant role in situational
awareness because pilots and controllers quickly learn to recognise aircrafttype/
callsign associations (i.e. Foxtrot Kilo Golf is a Fokker F28, Romeo Mike
Foxtrot is a B767).
6.4 Code Switching
Code switching refers to the habitual switching back and forth from one language to
another of bilingual and multilingual speakers during the course of a conversation.
This is due to inherent social and cognitive features of how language works that are
still poorly understood. Perhaps the most well known example of this occurred at
Tenerife (see appendix 2). The problem can also arise between speakers of the same
　
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