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prescribed in clause 6.5.12 of the 1985 civil aviation flight operation manual, the
190 m altitude of the cloud base as clarified from the weather observer and
instructed them to descend to an altitude of 850 m to the final leg: "Sibir 778,
cloud base 190, descend to final 850". At 22:38 the crew reported that they were
at the final leg and were at 850 m (control transfer point between the controllers
of the AppCC/ArCC and ICC/ACS). The controller instructed the crew: "Sibir
778, perform final leg, work with tower on 118 point 1".
At 22:38 the crew reported to the ICC/ACS controller: "Irkutsk tower, Sibir
778, good morning, on the final leg, at the boundary point, heading 2-9-5, 850".
The ICC/ACS controller notified the crew about the distance to the runway (21
km) and instructed them to continue the approach. At 22:39, the controller, on
checking the approach via the controller radar, communicated to the crew the
distance of 15 km and notified them that they were on final and were
approaching the glidepath. At 22:40 the crew reported that they were
descending, that the landing gear had been deployed and that they were ready to
land. After the TCC/ASCC controller reported to the ICC/ACS controller that
the paved runway was free, the latter permitted the crew to land. At a distance of
11 km from runway 30, the ICC/ACS controller notified the crew that they were
somewhat left of course. At a distance of 9 km the crew was notified that they
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
38
were on course. At 22:41 the ICC/ACS controller again warned the crew: "Sibir
778, distance 6, you are deviating to the right". After 26 seconds the crew
reported that they were flying over the outer marker beacon (RMB). The
controller confirmed that the airplane was on final.
According to his own statement, ICC/ACS the controller visually observed
that, after the airplane had emerged from the cloud cover, it was following the
usual trajectory without any significant deviations, when it made a slight turn to
the left. The controller then noticed that the A-310 landed at the touchdown zone
of the offset threshold of runway 30 and was continuing to run along the center
line of the paved runway. The controller also noticed that the crew used the
thrust reverser, since he saw the characteristic mist spray (particles of water)
rising from the wet surface of the paved runway. While running along the
second half of runway 30, approximately in the RD5 sector, the crew reported
that they had landed. They then received landing confirmation from the
ICC/ACS controller at 22:44 and instruction to exit the runway to the left along
taxiway 6.
Note: The SOP of Russian airlines during domestic
flights provides for a "landing" report to the
controller after deceleration to taxi speed.
The TCC/ASCC controller, monitoring the movement of the A-310 along
the second half of the paved runway, noticed that the airplane was running at a
high velocity past taxiway 6 with the exit to the 400-meter segment of the paved
runway over the threshold of runway 12 and, not slowing down, was
overshooting the runway.
After the airplane collided with the barriers, and observing the explosion
and outbreak of fire in the airplane, both controllers immediately reported this to
the aerodrome flight operations director (AFOD).
At 22:45 the AFOD issued the alarm signal to all departments of Irkutsk
airport in accordance with the notification flow chart. After checking the
passage of the alarm signal, the flight operations director ordered the controller
in the airport control tower to send out the initial report of the accident, and
ordered the weather observer at the main observation point to compile an
extraordinary observation of the actual weather.
At 22:46 the AFOD gave the command to the TCC/ASCC controller to stop
releasing other aircraft, and to the ACT controller to send a telegram about the
closure of Irkutsk airport for technical reasons until further notice.
At 22:49 a record of the extraordinary observation of the actual weather
was drawn up in conjunction with meteorological specialists.
At 23:00, after examining the airfield together with the airport service
supervisor and inspector, a record of the condition of the paved runway was
drawn up.
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
39
Note: The pieces of rubber that had been ripped off from the tire of a wheel
on the right landing gear bogie while the А-310 F-OGYP airplane was on its
landing run, and were lying on the right shoulder of the runway were not found
during the examination of the runway after the accident. The pieces of rubber
　
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