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with modern devices for measuring and processing results to replace
existing visual recording equipment, has not been carried out.
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4.18. The friction coefficient on the runway measured by the authorities of
Irkutsk airport and the resultant statement on the braking conditions
given to the crew in the ATIS information “MIKE” (“braking action
good”), actually turned out to be much worse and corresponded to the
braking conditions on “a runway covered in water”. The existing
procedure for estimating the state of the runway did not make it
possible to determine accurately the braking conditions for water
covered runways at speeds that were significantly greater than the
measurements speed .
4.19. After the accident, no sketches were made and no tracks of the
airplane’s progress along the runway were described.
4.20. At the Irkutsk airport weather station, the qualifications of its
technical observers had not been improved, in violation of the terms of
the licensing requirements imposed on the autonomous non-commercial
organization, the “Irkutsk Meteorological Agency”.
4.21. The wording set out in the warning section of TR 02-78 of the
MMEL AIRBUS (CAUTION), in which the use of a thrust reverse
lever is not recommended for an engine whose thrust reverser was
deactivated, and the need to check the position of the relevant throttle
control lever in the “idle” setting while on the landing run is prescribed,
is partially incorrect in its use of the singular and plural number for
some nouns and verbs, which, in conjunction with its position on the
page (at the end of a section), does not exclude any ambiguous
understanding of the essence of caution. The caution is also incorrect in
terms of stating that the forward thrust will increase in cases of using
the reverse thrust lever for an engine whose thrust reverser has been
deactivated.
The wording of a similar warning in Sibir’s MEL (edition 5), confirmed
by the aviation authorities of Russia on 1 August 2006, does not
correspond to the sense incorporated in the aircraft manufacturer’s
document and essentially excludes any correct understanding by its
crews.
4.22. This airplane’s set of equipment did not anticipate the provision of
any smoke-protection equipment for the flight attendants being placed
in the central part of the fuselage. Smoke protection equipment for
flight attendants in the tail section of the cabin was located on the wall
at the side of the passenger cabin. This did not allow flight attendants to
quickly fetch it if the need arose.
4.23. When compiling the loading chart and the centre-of-gravity diagram,
neither was the weight of the containers and pallets taken into
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119
consideration, nor was the incorrect number of crew members shown
(two service passengers were not taken into account).
4.24. During the registration of the air tickets, on numerous coupons, the
columns for indicating the presence of passengers’ hold luggage and
hand luggage were not filled in.
4.25. When recording the hazardous freight, freight invoice no. 421-
0867902 was corrected by hand to no. 421-0867961, but the correction
was not confirmed with a stamp and signature.
4.26. On the fuselage of the F-OGYP airplane, there was no emergency
and rescue layout diagram for the ground emergency and rescue
services.
4.27. The fire and rescue service staff of Irkutsk airport and the Irkutsk
Civil Aviation Regional Search and Rescue base were not allowed to
use their normal individual smoke-protection equipment when carrying
out rescue work in the conditions of the severely smoke-filled airplane
cabin because of the lack of the necessary time for their preparation for
use.
4.28. The range of delivering a fire-extinguishing compound from the fireengine
gun-carriage barrels when it was impossible to deploy the fire
engines close to a burning airplane did not ensure the delivery of the
fire-extinguishing compound to the seat of the fire, as a result of which
it became necessary to lay hose pipes from the fire engines to the
airplane and deliver the fire-extinguishing compound through them,
which excluded immediate fire-extinguishing operations from being
carried out.
4.29. The normal means of communication did not ensure the effective
management of the rescue teams in carrying out their rescue work on
the airplane. The existing portable radio sets reduced the effectiveness
of the fire-extinguishing operations because of the need to constantly
　
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