曝光臺 注意防騙 網曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費者

4.2. Aircraft operations were accompanied by a significant number of
defects that had been postponed, according to the MEL. Its last flight
was carried out with 6 postponed defects authorized, including the
deactivated thrust reverser on the left engine, a fault in the no. 2 system
for raising and lowering flaps and a fault in the no. 2 autopilot, which,
together with the overall number of extensions to the delayed faults in
the A-310 airplane being operated during the first half of 2006 (86) and
the presence of recurring defects, testify to substantial shortcomings in
organizing the technical maintenance of A-310 airplane within Sibir.
4.3. The difficulties involved in the customs clearance of spare parts
imported from abroad in circumstances requiring the urgent correction
of faults (within 10 days) resulted in the universal practice of operating
flights with defects being postponed for long periods.
4.4. The current Guide to the technical operation of the A-310 airplane
does not envision any periodic check or adjustment of the effort
required to move the throttle control lever, as a result of which, in the
process of prolonged use, the efforts made can drop to levels that were
considerably lower than the minimum permitted level specified by the
airplane maintenance guide.
4.5. The reverse thrust control procedure of A-310 airplane with P&W
4000 engines recommends not to use the thrust reverse lever for an
engine whose thrust reverser has been deactivated, which prevents the
same procedures from being used by the crew to select reverse thrust in
various situations.
4.6. The design of the throttle and reverse levers does not prevent pilots
inadvertently moving the throttle lever forward of an engine whose
thrust reverser has been deactivated when operating the thrust reverser
on the other engine per the manufacturer’s recommended procedure.
4.7. During the rollout after landing, the on-board “wrong take-off
configuration” audio and light warning system was triggered as per
design as a result of the actual crew actions. According to the FCOM,
this warning is inhibited during the rollout phase of the flight.
4.8. The investigation of the air incident involving the A-310 airplane
UK-31001 that occurred on 3 March 1999 at Sheremetovo airport was
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
117
not thoroughly carried out. The airplane and engine developers were not
invited to participate in the investigation. According to the results of the
investigation, the Commission did not draft any specific
recommendations for the flight crew or the developers of the engine
control system aimed at preventing any similar occurrences in the
future.
4.9. In the Russian Federation, there is no universal course for improving
the qualifications of flight crew that is aimed at studying the features of
crew resources management (CRM), when converting from Russian
aircraft with three or more crew members to aircraft with a two-man
flight crew.
4.10. The Sibir A-310 FPTP allowed the commissioning as A-310 airplane
captains of pilots who have no experience on two-crew member aircraft
without undergoing the co-pilot training course and without flight
operations experience on type as co-pilot.
4.11. The practice of allowing flights with extended "deferred" defects
without any form of control procedure exercised by the Russian
aviation authorities in each specific instance had taken root in Sibir.
4.12. The appropriate training to support flights using the MEL was absent
from the airline crew training system.
4.13. Sibir did not draw up any course for the basic training of instructors.
4.14. Investigations of most air incidents within Sibir were reduced to
mere statements of fact, without any detailed analysis of the parameters
of the flight or the actions of the crew.
4.15. Sibir’s psychologist’s recommendation to admit the Captain to the A-
310 conversion training course on the basis of a non-objective
assessment of the pilot’s personal qualities appears to be without
adequate foundation.
4.16. The section entitled “Guide to ensuring the psychological selection,
training and professional activity of civil aviation flight crew and air
traffic control staff in the Russian Federation” does not ensure the
psychologists’ standardized rules of selection for conversion to new
aircraft and requires substantial additional work.
4.17. Order no. NA-30-r of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian
Federation dated 24.01.01, on providing friction coefficient measuring
vehicles (ATT-2) in Irkutsk airport (and a number of other airports)
　
中國航空網 www.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：航空資料11(64)