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masks for each cabin crew member.
Sibir was authorized to operate an A-310 type airplane based on Decision
no. 157/007 of the Flight Inspection Administration (FIA) of FTOA on June 28,
2004. However, the Agreement on continued airworthiness between the State of
Operator (Russia) and the State of Registry (France), as described by Article 33
of the Air Code of the Russian Federation, was not signed. The previous
Agreements on the operation of French-registered A-310 airplanes at Aeroflot
and Saxa-Avia airlines had run their course by the time these airlines had
stopped operating this type of airplane.
Note: French Civil Aviation legislation does not require
this kind of agreement to be signed.
The airplane has flown 59,865 hours since the start of operations and has
made 12,550 landings, which do not exceed the established and assigned
resource (80,000 h/35,000 landings).
All types of maintenance prescribed by regulations were carried out by
the due dates and in full. Before the last flight, operational types of maintenance
were carried out on the airplane at Domodedovo airport: "DLY check" and "PF"
(daily and pre-flight maintenance checks). The maintenance personnel who took
direct part in the technical servicing of the airplane had valid licenses
authorizing them to work. The level of professional training of the maintenance
personnel met the requirements of the State of Registry and Operator of the
airplane.
Note: As a result of a study of the airplane's maintenance
records and an analysis of evidence given by specialists
of OOO S7 ENGINEERING, it was established that 6
malfunctions and failures on the airplane had not been
rectified at the time of take-off. According to the
standard documentation (MMEL) of the designer and
manufacturer of the airplane - Airbus Industry, as well
as the current Sibir "Minimum Equipment List" (MEL)
approved by the Federal Transport Oversight Authority
on June 7, 2006, with subsequent Revision no. 1 on June
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
89
20, 2006, flights with recognized malfunctions and
failures may be carried out during the time
corresponding to each malfunction and fault.
Special attention among the above-mentioned
malfunctions and failures is focused on the deactivation
in the last flight of the system for reverse thrust of the
left engine, which is related to the failure of the thrust
reverser during a prior landing at Irkutsk airport that
was recorded by the Captain. It should be noted that the
prior flight along the route Domodedovo - Irkutsk -
Domodedovo was carried out by the Captain with a
deactivated thrust reverser on the right engine because
of the malfunction of the flexible drive shaft. After the
non-rectification of the failure of the thrust reverser on
the left engine, this thrust reverser was deactivated, and
the flexible shaft from it was installed on the reverser on
the right engine, which was used to bring the right
thrust reverser into working order (activated).
Apart from the above-mentioned deactivated
condition of the reverser of engine no. 1, at the time of
take-off the presence of 5 more non-rectified failures
was recorded in the flight log. Among these were the
following failures: auto-pilot no. 2 and system no. 2 on
the flap control11.
In the first six months of 2006, 86 extensions of
deferred defects (expired dates beyond those prescribed
in the MEL) on A-310 airplane were documented with
the permission of the Airworthiness Support
Administration of the FTOA. A study of the history of the
operation of the airplane that was involved in the
accident also shows the presence of repeated failures
(for example, in the auto-pilot system) which, in
conjunction with the large number of extensions of
deferred defects, attests to the shortcomings in the
maintenance of A-310 type airplane at Sibir.
It should be noted that the presence on an
airplane of such a number of authorized deferred defects
or their combination does not have any standardized
limitations, which allows airplane to fly even with a
whole series of failures and malfunctions, which may
significantly complicate the flight operation of an
airplane and have a negative effect on the
11 This failures did not contribute to the accident
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
90
psychophysiological condition of the crew.
All aircraft and engine systems, with the exception of the defects deferred
as per the MEL, were operational upon take-off from Moscow. The commission
also did not discover any signs of failure of any aircraft or engine system during
　
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