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for turbulence was discussed during cabin crew emergency training.
It was evident that the cabin crew were conversant with the
company policy and procedures in preparation for turbulence and
that they were adequately trained to handle the situation as was
demonstrated in this accident.
2.7.2. After the accident, the CP, though slightly injured, promptly
informed the flight crew of the occurrence. She made a number of
Public Address (PA) broadcasts to the passengers and crew. She
enlisted the help of a doctor, six passengers with nursing
experience and a policeman to attend to the injured cabin
attendants. She also solicited help from passengers to assist in
cleaning up the cabin to avoid further injuries to passengers and
crew.
2.7.3. Subsequent to the turbulence encounter, on the instructions of the
PIC, the Co-pilot left the flight deck on several occasions to check
on the conditions in the cabin and to keep the PIC informed. He
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assisted in the control of passengers and helped the cabin crew,
who were caring for their seriously injured colleagues.
2.7.4. The CP demonstrated commendable competence and
professionalism in handling a difficult situation in the cabin. She
orchestrated available resources to ensure that the injured persons
were given appropriate attention. The remainder of the cabin crew
members, who were all injured to some degree, continued to
function effectively as a team in a challenging situation and to
discharge their duties for the remainder of the flight. Those
passengers who volunteered assistance to the cabin staff are also to
be commended.
2.8. Crew Communication and CRM Training
2.8.1. The suddenness and severity of the turbulence encounter and the
rapid changes in aircraft altitude and speed demanded the
immediate attention of the PF, whose proper priority was to fly the
aircraft. After the turbulence encounter, both the PIC and the Copilot
inspected the cabin. The Co-pilot had assisted the cabin crew
in the control of passengers.
2.8.2. After parking the aircraft, the flight crew remained on the flight
deck for approximately 23 minutes. During this period, besides
completing an entry in the Technical Log concerning the encounter
with severe turbulence, it was stated that some technical issues
were discussed between the PIC and the Co-pilot. However, as the
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CVR tape was erased at 0658:13, the remaining portion of the CVR
tape did not reveal any record of such discussion nor of any record
of communication with the cabin.
2.8.3. In the cabin, after the turbulence encounter, the CP re-allocated
staff resources for the remainder of the flight to cope with reduced
cabin staff capability, to attend to the seriously injured crew
members and to prepare the cabin for landing.
2.8.4. The investigation team looked into the effectiveness of
communication between flight crew and cabin crew in handling the
emergency situation. Whilst no serious deficiency was identified,
the investigation team noted that certain aspects of CRM training
do not entirely conform to the requirements stipulated in the Air
Operator’s Certificate Requirements Documents (CAD 360).
2.8.5. The successful resolution of aircraft emergencies requires effective
co-ordination and interaction between flight crew and cabin crew.
To this end, CAD 360 states that operators should, as far as
practicable, provide combined CRM training for flight crew and
cabin crew and that CRM recurrent training should be provided.
However, the operator currently runs CRM courses for flight crew
and cabin crew separately. It is also noted that the operator
conducts annual CRM recurrent training only for cabin crew but
not for flight crew. The investigation team is of the view that more
emphasis should be placed on the importance of effective coordination
and communication among all crew members through
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combined CRM training and recurrent CRM training for both flight
crew and cabin crew. There is therefore a need for the operator to
review its CRM training programme so as to conform to the
CAD 360 requirements.
2.9. Fasten Seat Belt Signs (FSBS)
2.9.1. On the day of the occurrence, the same flight crew and cabin crew
operated both sectors Hong Kong – Kota Kinabalu – Hong Kong.
On the outbound sector from Hong Kong to Kota Kinabalu, the
flight conditions were reported to be ‘bumpy’ with ‘light chop’ by
the flight crew. Although normal passenger service was carried out,
it is reasonable to conclude that both the flight and cabin crew
would not have anticipated a smooth ride on the return sector to
　
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