曝光臺(tái) 注意防騙 網(wǎng)曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費(fèi)者

Rushed and unstabilized approaches:
The following circumstances, factors and errors often are cited when discussing rushed and unstabilized approaches:
.  
Fatigue, regardless of short/medium-haul or long-haul operation,

This highlights the need for developing countermeasures to restore the level of vigilance and alertness for the descent, approach and landing;

.  
Pressure of flight schedule (e.g., making up for takeoff delay);

 

Human Factors in Approach and Landing Accidents
Page 3

.  Any crew-induced or controller-induced circumstance resulting in insufficient time to plan, prepare and execute a safe approach;
This includes accepting requests from ATC for:
.  flying higher and/or faster than desired; and/or,
.  flying shorter routings than desired;

.  
Insufficient ATC awareness of crew or aircraft capability to accommodate a last-minute-change;

.  
Late takeover from automation (e.g., in case of AP failing to capture the GS, usually due to crew failing to arm the approach mode);

.  
Lack of awareness of tail wind component;

.  
Incorrect anticipation of aircraft deceleration characteristics in level-flight or on a 3-degree glideslope;

.  
Failure to recognize excessive parameter-deviations or to remember the excessive-parameter-deviation criteria;

.  
Belief that the aircraft will be stabilized at the stabilization height or shortly thereafter;

.  
PNF excessive confidence in the PF in achieving a timely stabilization;

.  
PF/PNF excessive reliance on each other in calling excessive deviations or in calling go-around; and/or,

.  
Visual illusions during the acquisition of visual references or during the visual segment.

Runway excursions and overruns:
The following factors are recurrent in runway excursions and overruns (i.e., highlighting human factors involving controllers, flightcrew and maintenance personnel alike):
.  
No go-around decision, when warranted;

.  
Inaccurate weather information on:

.  surface wind;
.  runway condition; and/or,
.  wind shear;

.  
Incorrect assessment of crosswind limit for prevailing runway conditions;

.  
Incorrect assessment of landing distance:

.  for prevailing wind and runway conditions; or,
.  following a malfunction affecting the configuration or braking capability;

.  
Captain (when PNF) taking over control and landing following the call or initiation of a go-around by the First Officer (as PF);

.  
Late takeover from automation, when required (e.g., late take over from autobrake in case of system malfunction);

.  
Inoperative equipment not accounted for per MEL (e.g., one or more brake being inoperative); and/or,

.  
Undetected thrust asymmetry (i.e., forward / reverse asymmetric thrust condition).

Adverse wind / crosswind landing:
The following human factors often are cited in discussing events involving adverse wind / crosswind conditions:
.  
Reluctance to recognize changes in landing data over time (e.g., wind direction shift, wind velocity change or wind gustiness increase);

.  
Seeking any evidence to confirm the initial information and initial options (i.e., reluctance to change pre-established plans);

.  
Reluctance to divert to an airport with less crosswind conditions; and/or,

.  
Lack of time to observe, evaluate and control the aircraft attitude and flight path in a highly dynamic situation.

Summary of key points
Addressing Human Factors issues in approach-and-landing incidents and accidents is an effort that must include:
　
中國航空網(wǎng) www.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：Getting to Grips with Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reducti(55)