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DECISION MAKING  Problem definition / diagnosis  Reviews causal factors with other crew members 
Option generation  States alternative courses of action Asks other crew member for options 
Risk assessment / Option choice  Considers and shares risks of alternative courses of action 
Outcome review  Checks outcome against plan 

Very Poor  Poor  Acceptable  Good  Very Good 
Observed behaviour directly endangers flight safety  Observed behaviour in other conditions could endanger flight safety  Observed behaviour does not endanger flight safety but needs improvement  Observed behaviour enhances flight safety  Observed behaviour optimally enhances flight safety and could serve as an example for other pilots 

 

University of Texas Behavioural Markers
The following text has been extracted from the GIHRE report
The original behavioural marker system in the U.S. originated in the University of Texas Human Factors Research Project (then called the NASA/UT Project) in the late 1980s. There were two goals associated with the effort: the first was to evaluate the effectiveness of CRM training as measured by observable behaviours, while the second was to aid in defining the scope of CRM programmes. The first manual to assist check airmen and evaluators in assessing the interpersonal component of flying was issued by NASA/UT in 1987. Originally, ratings of crew performance were made by observers assessing a complete flight from initial briefing to landing, taxi-in, and shutdown of engines.
The first set of behavioural markers was included by the Federal Aviation Administration as an Appendix to its Advisory Circular on CRM (AC-150A). Development of the markers was supported by a grant from the FAA. Systematic use of the markers grew as airlines enhanced assessment of crew performance and as the University of Texas project began collecting systematic data on all aspects of an airline’s operations in a programme known as the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). The markers themselves were incorporated in a form for systematic observations known as the Line/LOS Checklist (LOS refers to line operational or full mission simulation). As experience and the database of observations grew, it became apparent that there was significant variability in crew behaviour during flights that needed to be captured. Accordingly, the form was modified to assess the markers for each phase of flight.
In 1995, a validation of the markers was undertaken by classifying their impact (positive and negative) in analyses of aviation accidents and incidents. The results of the analysis provided strong support for the utility of the markers as indicators of crew performance and their value as components of CRM training.
LOSA evolved over time from a sole assessment of the behavioural markers to a focus on threat and error management. In this iteration (now reflected in the 9th generation of the data collection instrument), threats and errors are classified and their management assessed along with a greatly reduced set of behavioural markers. The new focus on threat and error management provided hard, empirical criteria against which to pit the markers. In this process, a number of overlapping markers were dropped to yield a smaller, but highly influential list. These are shown, along with the phase of flight in which collected, in the following section.
　
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