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inaccuracy committed by the controller while reporting the weather to the crew was not directly
connected with the cause of the aircraft accident, but it influenced the initial decision of the crew
to return to the departure aerodrome.
- At 22:01:37 the approach controller advised the crew of the observed weather at Sochi
aerodrome as at 22:00 and by mistake said the cloud ceiling was “considerable 1800”, instead of
180 m, however this did not influence the Captain’s decision.
- At 22:03:29 the crew did not report, and the holding controller did not request the crew to report
the selected system and mode of approach, which does not meet the requirements of the Holding
Controller’s Operation Manual, Section 4, item 4.2.1, of Sochi aerodrome.
- At 22:11:38 the final controller at Sochi aerodrome was informed by the weather observer on
the actual weather at Sochi aerodrome with the cloud ceiling at 100 m, which was below the
established minima (cloud ceiling 170 m, visibility 2500 m). Based on this information, the final
controller instructed the crew: “Abort descent, clouds at 100 m, right-hand climbing turn to 600
meters”. The controller’s actions did not comply with the requirements of the Civil Flight
Operations Guidance 85 Section 6.5.16 and the Final Controller’s Operation Manual, items 4.3
and 4.3.1.
However, according to the AIP of Russia the controller had a right to forbid the landing. It should
be noted that a number of AIP items contradict each other and are ambiguous.
4.6. Meteorological support:
- The weather forecast for the Sochi aerodrome for the period from 18:00 to 03:00 was not
verified with regard to visibility in the “At times” group;
- In violation of the Guidance for Meteorological Support in Civil Aviation 95, Sections 4.3.1 and
4.4.1 d) and the Instruction for meteorological support at Sochi aerodrome, the observer did not
complete the special weather report at 22:11, when the cloud ceiling descended to 100 m, i.e. to a
value stipulated in Annex 8 of the Criteria For Issuance of a Special Weather Report;
- The recommendation for ATIS broadcast content stipulated in the joint Order No. 62/41 “On
approval and implementation of Instruction for ATIS broadcast content in English and Russian
languages” of 20.03.2000 issued by the Federal Air Transport Administration and
Hydrometeorology and Environment Monitoring Service was not entirely fulfilled.
4.7. A320 aircraft:
- In course of reading out the FDR data, a number of discrepancies were found in the
documentation describing the logic of binary signal recordings;
54
- While performing manoeuvres in the landing configuration with the autopilot and autothrust
engaged, the LOW ENERGY WARNING may sound, which Airbus considers as an abnormal
situation.
5. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 To aviation administrations of the CIS countries:
- To conduct briefings with the flight crews, controllers and technical and engineering personnel
to review the circumstances and the causes of the accident.
- To ensure fulfilment of the requirements of ICAO Annex 6 Part 1 Chapter 3 for mandatory
analysis of performed flight operations based on the CVR and FDR recordings for the aircraft
with a certified MTOW exceeding 27000 kg.
- To draw the attention of A320 crews to the necessity of immediate response to activation of the
EGPWS warning (even if other warnings are on at the same time) in the case of instrument flight,
or flight in difficult weather conditions, or flight in the mountains. To introduce the relevant
exercises in the simulator training programmes to practice these actions. To consider the
advisability of extending these recommendations to other aircraft types.
- To review the necessity of enhancing crew simulator training in the section on flying in Flight
Director mode, especially during approach and go-around.
- To bring the content of the AIP, as well as the ATC controllers’ job descriptions and operations
manuals, into compliance with the standards and practices recommended by ICAO, with regard
to clearance for approach and landing.
5.2 To aviation administrations of CIS countries jointly with the industrial and scientific
and research organizations:
- To organize and conduct research into the conditions under which a crew may lose spatial
orientation and/or upset aircraft attitude may develop, and to issue practical recommendations to
enhance flight safety. In particular, to evaluate the effect of in-flight acceleration illusions. Based
on the research, to develop and introduce a specialized course for recurrent training of crews that
should contain both classroom and flying training.
　
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