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TUNIS fix.
At 20:52:09 the approach controller instructed the crew of A320 EK-32009 to climb to FL 200
and get in touch with the regional control centre “Yerevan-Control”.
At 20:52:23 the crew was instructed to climb to FL 300. At 20:52:41 setting of an altitude of
9,130 m was recorded, and after that the aircraft continued climbing in the CLIMB mode.
At 20:54:17 the crew requested permission to head the aircraft towards the en-route BARUS fix
and obtained the controller’s permission to change the flight route.
According to the radar data provided by the Yerevan Regional Control Centre, A320 EK-32009
twice crossed the Turkish frontier, at 20:58:00 and 21:01:00 (Attachment 2, Fig. 11-12). Based
on the communications between the crew of flight RNV-967 and the Yerevan Regional Control
Centre controller, it was established that crossing of the state frontier was not envisaged.
However, due to the turbulence, according to Flight RNV-967 radar tracking data, the path of the
aircraft track on the radar screen was in the vicinity of the state frontier. The Turkish ATC
agencies did not raise any claims in connection with unauthorized crossing of the state frontier.
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At 20:59:51 the crew reported: “Control, Armavia 967 approaching abeam TUNIS FL 300”, and
received instruction from the controller: “Armavia 967, contact Tbilisi-Control 134.6, goodbye”.
At 21:00:07 the crew contacted the controller of the Tbilisi Regional Centre “North”: “Tbilisi-
Control, RNV-967, good night, 300, abeam TUNIS, signed FL 340” and were instructed: “RNV-
967, good night, monitoring you on the radar, climb to 340, heading to BANUT”. The crew
confirmed in compliance with the instruction.
At 21:01:49 the controller of Tbilisi Regional Centre “North” instructed: “967, head to BARUS
at present, you are going to cross the frontier. The frontier is very close, heading to BARUS at
present”. The crew obeyed.
At 21:04:34 the controller of the Tbilisi Regional Centre “North” instructed: “Sochi, weather
2000 by 170 runway 06 and 02”. This weather was below the established minima for the landing
aerodrome. The minima at Sochi aerodrome were 170 x 2500 for runway 06 and 220 x 3000 for
runway 02.
At 21:05:49 the controller cleared the aircraft on a heading to the compulsory reporting point
BANUT: “RNV-967, you may head to BANUT and work with Tbilisi-control 133.4”.
The target flight level 340 was reached at about 21:07:00.
The cruise altitude was ~33900 ft (~10300 m), at an indicated airspeed of ~265 kt (~490 km/h)
in the NAV mode, with the autothrust in the V/M MODE (the airspeed hold mode), and with the
ALT MODE (the altitude hold mode) selected. At 21:08:35 the Allied Signal 4700 recorded
disengagement of Autopilot 1 and engagement of Autopilot 2.
At 21:10:21, in the area of Tbilisi Regional Centre responsibility, the crew contacted the
controller of Sochi approach control and asked him to clarify if the weather could be expected to
improve. At 21:10:46 the controller of Sochi approach control passed on the following
information: “RNV-967, well, now the weather is below the minima here, that is on RW 06: the
cloud ceiling at 170 m, visibility 2000. And the minima is 170 by 2500. And on the RW 02 the
cloud ceiling is 170 m, visibility 2000. 220 is required there”. In response the crew informed:
“Well, I’ve got the fuel, yes, for an hour of flight. Is 2500 expected within an hour?”, and later, at
21:11:43, they requested: “Clarify further. Within an hour, if there is 2500, then we will hold and
land”.
At 21:16:07, having consulted with a forecaster, the controller of Sochi approach control advised:
“RNV-967, so, the forecast for two hours: 150 by 1500”. This forecast weather was below the
established aerodrome minima for landing.
Note: The Sochi approach controller reported the weather forecast for Sochi aerodrome to the
crew, but did not give the trend
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“AT TIMES”. Inaccuracies by the controller while reporting the weather to the crew were not
directly connected with the cause of the aircraft accident, but they influenced the initial decision
of the crew to return to the departure aerodrome.
At 21:16:14 the Captain contacted the Tbilisi Regional Centre “West” controller and advised him
of their decision to return to the Zvartnots departure aerodrome (Yerevan). At that moment the
aircraft was in the area of compulsory reporting point ALIKA, at a distance of 180 km from
Sochi airport, the flight altitude was 33,900 ft (10300 m), and the indicated airspeed was 265 kt
　
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