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order to decrease the climb rate and to increase speed.
After the warning sounded, the thrust control levers were set in the TOGA position, therefore the
crew response was fully in accordance with the QRH recommendations. The control input on the
thrust control levers resulted in activation of the go-around modes (PITCH GO and ROLL GO),
the autothrust was deactivated (AT engaged, but not active), and the ECAM page changed from
WHEEL to ENGINE (Attachment 2, Fig. 4, 5 and 6). At 22:12:06:5 disengagement of autopilot 1
was recorded, and the rest of the flight was performed in director mode, with the Captain’s and
co-pilot’s flight directors engaged. Judging from the single annunciation of the autopilot
disengagement, the autopilot was disengaged normally, with the push-button on the side stick. At
the moment when the autopilot was disengaged, the flight altitude was 1232 ft (370 m), indicated
airspeed 130 kt (240 km/h), roll angle +25º, pitch angle +21º, angle of attack 10.2º, and the rate
of climb about 11 m/s.
Analysis of the given flight segment shows that the crew carried out the controller’s instruction
literally, meaning that they stopped descent and started performing a right-hand turn and then
climb. Not a single action of those required in the go-around procedure (setting takeoff power,
flaps retraction from the landing configuration, landing gear retraction) was performed by the
crew. This fact shows that the crew‘s work was far from optimal, and that they were unable to
evaluate the current situation adequately. It can also be suggested that the aircraft behaviour
while manoeuvring and activation of the LOW ENERGY WARNING were unexpected for the
crew. Most probably, the autopilot was disengaged intentionally, because of doubts about
whether it was functioning correctly.
Simulation of the given segment of the automatic flight on the engineering simulator, which fully
reproduces the control laws and indications of the accident aircraft, showed perfect convergence
of the results. During the manoeuvre the autopilot worked in accordance with the established
logic. Based on the FDR readout and the results of mathematical simulation, it was determined
that there was no external influence on the aircraft. It should be noted that the A320 FCOM does
not describe this mode (climbing turn in the landing configuration).
In the course of experiments on the simulator the following was also established:
44
• Provided that the FCOM procedures are followed, the aircraft performs the goaround
manoeuvre with no difficulties, with a maximum pitch angle of 15-16º, the aircraft speed
not less than VAPP, and the LOW ENERGY WARNING «SPEED SPEED SPEED» not sounding.
In the case where the autopilot is disengaged during go-around, the procedure can still be
completed safely and does not induce any specific stress on the pilot, provided that he follows the
command bars.
• In the case where the pilot moves the thrust control levers to the TOGA position
at the beginning of the manoeuvre (after the OPEN CLIMB mode is engaged, with a pitch angle
of +5°…+10º), in FULL configuration, with the landing gear extended, then the aircraft in fact
performs a standard go-around manoeuvre, with υmax = 16-17º and no decrease in speed. This,
therefore proves the correctness of the FCOM recommendations provided in the GO AROUND
and MISSED APPROACH procedures, which require setting the thrust control lever in the
TOGA position first. This action ensures a safe go-around manoeuvre, even with the landing gear
extended or if the aircraft configuration is not changed by one step.
• In case the autopilot remains engaged, while the aircraft is performing a
manoeuvre similar to that in the accident flight, the autopilot normally completes the go-around
procedure, with the maximum pitch angle not exceeding 21.5º, the short-time decrease of speed
not exceeding 10-12 kt, with activation of the «SPEED SPEED SPEED» warning, and without
activation of the α – FLOOR function.
The flight segment from the moment when the autopilot was disengaged to the moment,
when right-and-forward control input on the Captain’s side stick was recorded after the
segment of stabilized turn
For the purpose of analysis of the this and the next segments, it should be noted that the crew was
probably in a state of psycho-emotional strain caused by a combination of the following factors:
• The necessity to carry out the go-around procedure, which is quite rarely
encountered in actual flight conditions;
• The night flight and the lack-of-sleep state of the crew (at least, of the co-pilot);
　
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