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was above the minima.
It may also be supposed that the crew experienced “a conflict of motives”, when equally
important motives are addressing opposing goals.
In the situation, there was both a group of motives relating to landing at Sochi airport and a
motive (or a group of motives) to carry out the controller’s instructions (a wish to avoid a conflict
with the Air Traffic Service). Such a psychological situation decreases the reliability of a
professional pilot and may result in erroneous or unfulfilled actions. As a result, it may be
supposed that the crew was in a dominant psychological state, the dominant element of which
was to land in Sochi airport, combined with “a conflict of motives”. Therefore, when the
controller instructed the crew to abort descent and perform a right climbing turn, the crew
fulfilled the instruction “literally”, not analyzing the situation, though it apparently was an
instruction to go around. Most likely, because of this the crew did not retract the landing gear and
did not set the high-lift devices in the appropriate configuration. The crew showed low mental
readiness to undertake any other task apart from landing at Sochi airport.
2. Low mental readiness of the Captain to switch to the manual mode.
Firstly, the unexpectedness of the instruction to go around at an altitude of about 390 m that was
above the expected decision altitude at which this manoeuvre is usually performed during
training.
Secondly, the dynamics and attitude of the airplane in the process of this manoeuvre were
unexpected by the Captain: pitch angle +21°, roll angle +25°, decrease in speed, activation of the
“SPEED SPEED SPEED” warning and impossibility to evaluate further changes in these
parameters.
It should be noted that while performing the go-around manoeuvre on a simulator in accordance
with the FCOM, the Captain remembered that the maximum pitch angle did not exceed 15° with
zero roll, and there was no decrease in speed.
In spite of the fact that after disengagement of the autopilot the Captain recovered the airplane to
stable flight with a roll angle of 20° and a small positive vertical speed (about 2 m/s), he probably
still felt startled and stressed. Possibly, the Captain tried to analyze the cause of such airplane
behaviour or his own mistakes.
Such a situation could result in mental torpor (stupor). In this state people may be numb and
passive or, on the contrary, overactive, when the actions being taken and their expediency
become chaotic. In such cases we may talk about the pilot being perplexed. This state can explain
inadequate, but still quite active actions by the pilot to increase the airplane roll and decrease the
pitch angle, and at the same time his very poor response to the GPWS warning (the PULL UP
warning).
In this state the pilot can concentrate on perception and analysis of only one, two or more flight
parameters, being incapable of perceiving and evaluating the situation as a whole. As a result, the
attention, perception and thoughts of the Captain and partially of the Co-pilot were concentrated
on monitoring of the flight speed. This is demonstrated by the crew’s (mostly Captain’s) actions
aimed at activation of the autopilot (setting of the altitude, though the autopilot was disengaged)
and the autothrust (pulling the thrust control levers back to IDLE and then pushing them forward
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to CLIMB, i.e. moving them too far), as well as flaps retraction at a speed exceeding the limits.
Their concentration on one or several flight parameters might have made the crew unable to
adequately perceive and analyze the situation as a whole, and also might have contributed to
partial loss of spatial orientation. During the last 40 seconds of the flight the crew might very
well have been in a state of mental torpor (judging by the Captain’s inputs and taking into
account the preceding factors). Being in this state, the crew failed to adequately and
comprehensively evaluate the situation and make the right decision. It is quite possible that the
co-pilot was out of the control loop during the go-around manoeuvre, being in contact with
controllers and only carrying out the Captain’s orders.
In the final stage of the flight, the crew apparently lost their spatial orientation, this being shown
by the lack of monitoring of the pitch, altitude, vertical speed and roll parameters by the Captain.
When the Co-pilot intervened in the control loop, he evaluated the roll and speed parameters
correctly, but did not monitor the descent parameters (pitch angle, altitude, descent rate) and did
not react to the “PULL UP” warning.
1.19 New methods used in investigation
　
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