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output, illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: (From Reising [9])
In older aircraft, there was a direct connection between
the pilot’s movement of the control yoke, through the
connecting cables, to the control surfaces. Later as
autopilots came in to the aircraft, the pilots indirectly
controlled the surfaces through these devices. Further,
with the introduction of flight management systems,
Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety & Operation, London, UK
© 2005: Royal Institution of Naval Architects
more technology was placed between the pilot and
control surfaces. The pilot’s mental model of how the
system worked became severely strained and resulted in
a lack of understanding of the relationship between the
automation and the control output. Some of these cockpit
problems were undoubtedly due to the automation
philosophy which drove the task sharing between the
crew and the automation.
The problems of aviation automation are welldocumented,
and have been summarised by Sarter et al
[10] as:
• Workload - Unevenly Distributed, Not Reduced.
• New Attentional and Knowledge Demands.
• Breakdowns in Mode Awareness and
"Automation Surprises".
• New Coordination Demands.
• The Need for New Approaches to Training.
• New Opportunities for New Kinds of Error.
• Complacency and Trust in Automation.
Recent research by Wood [8] has “indicated that there
was much evidence to support the concern that crews
were becoming dependent on flight deck automation.
Furthermore, the new human task of system monitoring
was made worse by the high reliability of the automation
itself. Little research exists to provide a structured basis
for determination of whether crews of highly automated
aircraft might lose their manual flying skills. However,
anecdotal evidence ... indicates that this is a concern
amongst practitioners. Finally, several MOR incidents
revealed that crews do respond inappropriately having
made an incorrect diagnosis of their situation in which
the automation fails.”
There is a body of guidance on solutions – not all of it
readily usable by practical engineers. “It is relatively
easy to get agreement that automation should be humancentered,
or that potentially hazardous situations should
be avoided; it is much more difficult to get agreement on
how to achieve these objectives”. [4]
The general intent is to have a human-machine team, as
described in Lützhöft [11], and having a coherent crewcentred
design philosophy [12].
4. CONCLUSIONS
The aviation industry has successful experience to offer
shipping as regards:
• Recognition of Human-Systems Integration and
developing a regulatory response to systemlevel
issues.
• Guidance on the design of automated cockpits
and systems that would translate to automated
bridges and their systems.
The aviation sector appears to offer shipping the
opportunity to learn from its mistakes as regards the
design of ‘strong and silent’ automation leading to
difficulties in teamworking, situation awareness and
mode awareness. Increasing the ‘distance’ between the
user and the platform and increasing the numbers of
modes should be viewed with considerable caution.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS
Attempts to achieve human-system integration can be
made through-life e.g. by making use of the ATOMOS
templates [7]. Monitoring the aircraft programmes using
the JAA Interim Policy [5] may offer lessons for
shipping regulation.
Changing contractual boundaries may facilitate the
integration of equipment and structural design.
The guidance and research on automation sponsored by
the aviation sector is tailored and applied to shipping.
6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to thank Andy Norris of Nottingham
University for stimulating exchanges of views, and
contributions from Jonathan Earthy, Hazel Courteney
and Paul Wood.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the policy of Lloyd's Register of
Shipping.
7. REFERENCES
1. POMEROY, R.V., TOMLINSON, C.M., 'A Systems
Approach to Integrating the Human Element into Marine
Engineering Systems', in 'Human Factors in Ship Design
and Operation', RINA International Conference, London,
Sept 2000.
2. NTSB 'Grounding of the Panamanian Passenger Ship
ROYAL MAJESTY on Rose and Crown Shoal near
Nantucket, Massachusetts, June 10, 1995'. NTSB PB97-
916401, Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-97/01,
　
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