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right yaw resulting from the application of that rudder would have increased the
aircraft roll to the right, and therefore increased the risk of a right wingtip or wingmounted
engine pod strike. The right roll was countered by rapid and large left
sidestick inputs by both crew members that resulted in an effective full left sidestick
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input in what appeared to be an instinctive ‘reflex’ response by both crew members
to prevent that risk.
There was no attempt by either crew member to partially ‘decrab’ the aircraft during
the landing flare. That was contrary to the advice provided by the manufacturer for
the performance of ‘…a safe crosswind landing…’ in higher crosswind conditions.
The lack of any ‘decrab’ therefore decreased safety margins and increased the risk of
main landing gear (MLG) damage at touchdown. It also increased the risk that the
resultant groundslip angle at touchdown would be of sufficient magnitude that the
MLG tyre side forces exceeded the ‘saturation’ point at which they entered a fullyskidded
state.
Air traffic services handling of the aircraft’s approach
to Melbourne
After discussing the crew’s intention to land on runway 34 with the acting Flow
Controller, the CANTY Sector Controller advised the crew that there was 23 kts
crosswind on that runway. The crew’s response that the crosswind was acceptable for
the proposed landing was consistent with that controller’s experience with other
international wide-body aircraft operations at Melbourne.
The acting Flow Controller’s unintended error of advising the CANTY Sector
Controller that there was 9 kts of crosswind on runway 34 was not a factor in the
occurrence, as the crew were already aware that the crosswind was 23 kts. However,
the acting Flow Controller used that (incorrect) information as justification to change
the landing runway for the aircraft from runway 34 to runway 16. Although the
change in runway was not justified from the operational aspect in terms of the
incorrectly reported 9 kts crosswind, it was operationally justified on the basis of the
9 kts of downwind affecting runway 34.
At 1134, the CANTY Sector Controller advised the crew that Melbourne automatic
terminal information service (ATIS) ‘Yankee’ was current, that the duty runway at
Melbourne was runway 27 and of the surface wind at the aerodrome. While the
controller did not provide the crew with specific information about the crosswind
affecting runway 16, if the crew had correctly interpreted the wind information
provided to them by the controller, it would have been evident that they could expect
30 kts of crosswind on runway 16.
As the crew sought no clarification or advice from the controller about the crosswind
conditions affecting runway 16, it was likely that they did not evaluate the crosswind
conditions from the information that they had been provided or, if they did, that they
considered the crosswind on runway 16 was acceptable for the landing.
Accurate information on the crosswind affecting runway 16 was available to the
Aerodrome Controller (ADC) from the controller’s second wind display during the
aircraft’s landing approach. Had the ADC provided the crew with the current wind
speed and direction, and advice of the greater than 12 kts crosswind affecting runway
16 in accordance with the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP), the crew
would have been aware that the crosswind affecting their landing was about 25 kts.
In any case, the crew should have been aware of the wind speed and direction during
the approach as a result of the information available from the aircraft’s navigation
display units. That awareness should have provided the crew with a reminder that
they could probably expect a degree of lee turbulence in the vicinity of the
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touchdown zone on runway 16, due to the passage of the surface wind over the treed
area to the north-west of the airport.
Calculated actual wind direction and speed
The 40 kt wind gust recorded at touchdown by the SSFDR was derived by the
ADIRUs that were located in the aircraft’s electrical and electronic compartment
beneath the cockpit. Because of their location forward of the aircraft centre of
gravity, the transient yaw accelerations during the landing flare would have affected
the accuracy of the recorded wind speed and direction data.
The recorded 40 kt wind gust was not consistent with the 1-minute interval data
recorded by the MLW1 anemometer that was located to the north-west of the
intersection of runways 16/34 and 09/27. That data revealed that it was likely that the
　
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