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intentions on the aerodrome traffic frequency (ATF) on 124.7 MHz.
The captain gave a traffic advisory announcing that the aircraft was taxiing on Foxtrot taxiway
crossing Runway 12; however, this advisory was not communicated on the ATF, 124.7 MHz.
While the aircraft was taxiing on Foxtrot taxiway, the airfield lighting extinguished and the flight
crew continued to taxi the aircraft without activating the ARCAL system. The first officer was
unfamiliar with operations at uncontrolled aerodromes, including ARCAL lighting procedures,
which resulted in the captain attempting to assist the first officer with his PNF duties.
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He directed the first officer to contact London Radio and inform the flight service specialist that
they did not observe any snow removal activity and to advise him that nobody was responding
to either the tower or ground frequency.
The first officer attempted to contact London Radio several times before the flight service
specialist asked Flight 0045 to please standby. Shortly after, the flight service specialist contacted
the flight crew to relay the IFR departure clearance. It took over three minutes for the first officer
to receive the clearance and read it back correctly. The captain then mistakenly broadcast a
traffic advisory on 126.7 MHz announcing that the aircraft was positioning onto the runway.
As the aircraft back-taxied on the runway, the flight crew reviewed the departure clearance,
actioned the before take-off checklist, and discussed the lack of runway lighting and the means
of activating the ARCAL lighting system. The first officer changed the radio frequency to the
ATF 124.7 MHz and activated the ARCAL lighting system; the runway edge lights and the
threshold end lights illuminated. The captain then saw the end of the runway and applied
heavy braking. The aircraft overran the runway, ran over a lighting bar standard damaging a
main wheel tire, travelled down a gentle slope, and stopped at a large drainage ditch running
perpendicular to the runway.
After the aircraft came to a stop, the flight crew communicated with London Radio to apprise
the flight service specialist of their situation. The London flight service specialist relayed the
flight crew’s request for maintenance assistance to the Windsor Airport Security Operations
Centre (SOC). SOC requested London FIC to direct the flight crew to communicate on the ATF,
124.7 MHz.
A digital, ground-speed readout is displayed in front of each pilot in the upper left corner of the
navigation display (ND) cathode ray tube (CRT).
The flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) were secured and forwarded to
the TSB Engineering Branch in Ottawa. The FDR revealed that the aircraft ground speed
increased to approximately 35 knots during the runway back-taxi and remained at that speed for
approximately one minute prior to the aircraft exiting the end of the runway. Three seconds
after activation of the ARCAL lighting system, the aircraft brake pedals were deflected to a
maximum angle of 80 degrees. Tire skidmarks were evident at the centre end of the runway. The
aircraft heading was relatively constant until the application of brakes.
A review of the Windsor ATF recorded transmissions indicated that Staff 28, an airport ground
vehicle, attempted to contact the flight crew on the ATF as the aircraft was holding short of
Runway 25. The flight crew did not respond to this communique. After communicating with the
firehall and Staff 29, Staff 28 attempted to contact the flight crew again; however, again there
was no response. Moments later, Staff 28 observed the aircraft proceed onto the unlit runway
and back-taxi. There was no broadcast message for this aircraft movement from the flight crew
on the ATF.
The aircraft was operating within the manufacturer’s specifications for both weight and centre
of gravity limitations, and records indicate that the aircraft was properly maintained in
accordance with existing regulation. There were no operational or mechanical defects involving
either the braking, hydraulic, or nose wheel steering systems. The aircraft’s anti-skid system was
activated and was functioning properly at the time of the occurrence.
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The Skyservice A320 Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM), Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs),
includes a directive that ground speed during taxi should be monitored by the flight crew. It
further provides guidance to pilots regarding maximum speeds for taxiing and ground
manoeuvring. Skyservice FCOM, SOP, Section 3.03.10, Page 2, states: “The normal maximum
taxi speed should be 30 knots in a straight line, 10 knots for a sharp turn. As the ground speed is
difficult to assess, monitor ground speed on the ND”.
　
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