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cloud and penetrated an area of severe turbulence and hail. The weather radar, when used by the
crew, did not show the severity of the weather ahead of the aircraft. This weather however, was
observed by the crew of the B757 on their weather radar display. The apparent lack of significant
weather returns resulted in the crew of the G-MIGJ turning off their weather radar. Having entered
the area of turbulence and hail associated with a storm cell, the PF made measured control inputs,
monitored by the commander, which reduced the excursions of the aircraft without imposing large
load factors on the airframe or those onboard. The absence of injuries sustained by the passengers
and crew was solely attributable to the timely illumination of the fasten seat belt signs and the fact
that most passengers were seated with their seat belts secure. The actions by the cabin crew, in not
attempting to move about the cabin but remaining on the floor during the worst of the turbulence,
probably assisted in avoiding injury. The maintenance of communication between the flight deck and
cabin crew throughout the flight meant that all crew were fully aware of the resulting course of action
decided upon by the commander. Having made an assessment of the damage to the aircraft caused by
the hail and the serviceability of the aircraft systems the flight deck crew continued to the planned
destination of Manchester, monitoring the fuel situation to ensure adequate fuel was available to
safely complete the flight.
It was not until the crew vacated the aircraft that they were aware of the extent and severity of the
damage to other areas of the airframe. Even though the manufacturer later confirmed that the aircraft
was in a safe condition to continue to its destination the commander stated that had he known the full
extent of the damage he would have diverted after the incident to the nearest suitable airfield.
Follow-up actions
The operator has since issued a Flying Staff Instruction to all flight crews reminding them of the
correct use of the weather radar.
Airbus A321-231, G-MIDJ
21
Recommendation
Present guidance material not only suggests that, in areas of thunderstorm activity, readjusting the
radar tilt frequently is the only way to monitor storm development but also that when the upper limit
of the storm cell is determined it should be avoided vertically by at least 5,000 feet. The inability of
weather radar to detect certain types of precipitation, associated with storm cells, in the upper levels of
the atmosphere above 30,000 feet however make it impossible to determine with any accuracy the
upper limit of a cell when its vertical development exceeds 30,000 feet. Calculations to determine the
aircraft's clearance above the upper limit of a cell can therefore be inaccurate resulting in an aircraft
entering the active element of a storm cell whilst attempting to safety over-fly it. It is therefore
recommended that:
Safety Recommendation 2004-47
The Civil Aviation Authority should consider reviewing their guidance material concerning the use
and interpretation of airborne weather radar, with a view to highlighting the potential for displayed
data to be unreliable when used for calculating the safe vertical clearance for overflight of active
storm cells.
Hydraulic Ram Air Turbine test kit
Hycom RAT kit HRK01:
• suitable for Airbus RAT test as per AMM chapter 29-24
• listed in Airbus tool and equipment manual
• approved by Airbus on A318/319/320/321/330/340
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HFK02
Flow control test kit and checkout unit
HRK01 is the order code for the complete test kit consisting of HFK02 and HRT01.
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HRT01
Ground check motor
1
PRELIMINARY REPORT
TACA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES FLIGHT 390
AIRBUS A320-233
REGISTER No. EI-TAF
TONCONTIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (MHTG/TGU)
TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS
MAY 30TH, 2008
PRELIMINARY REPORT;TACA INTL. AIRLINES; A320-233; MSN1374; REG. EI-TAF
2
A TACA Airlines Airbus A320, flight TA390, with Irish Registry EI-TAF, with 135
passengers and crew on board, overran at the end of the runway during landing at
Tegucigalpa caused the deaths of three people on board and two on the ground.
The government of Honduras delegated the conduct of investigation to the Salvadorian
Civil Aviation Authorities, as provided for in Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention.
　
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