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airplane when the pressurization system is being operated in the manual mode.
(A-01-17)
Review all Airbus Industrie A300-600 operators’ operating manuals and training
programs and require revisions, if necessary, to ensure that they clearly indicate
that
(1) automatic depressurization of the airplane upon landing will not occur when
the pressurization system is being operated in the manual mode; (A-01-18) and
(2) the Ram Air switch will not control the outflow valves and depressurize the
airplane when the pressurization system is being operated in the manual mode.
(A-01-19)
Require that the Airbus Industrie A300-600 On Ground/Emergency Evacuation
Checklist direct flight crews to ensure that the cabin differential pressure is
7
0 pounds per square inch before signaling flight attendants to begin an
emergency evacuation. (A-01-20)
Review all Airbus Industrie A300-600 operators’ checklists and training programs
for emergency ground evacuation and require revisions, if necessary, to ensure that
they direct flight crews to verify that the cabin differential pressure is 0 pounds per
square inch before signaling flight attendants to begin an emergency evacuation.
(A-01-21)
Review all Airbus Industrie A300-600 operators’ checklists and training programs
for parking and require revisions, if necessary, to ensure that they direct flight
crews to verify that the cabin differential pressure is 0 pounds per square inch
before permitting flight attendants or gate agents to open the cabin doors upon
arrival at the gate. (A-01-22)
Acting Chairman CARMODY and Members HAMMERSCHMIDT, BLACK, and
GOGLIA concurred in these recommendations.
By: Carol J. Carmody
Acting Chairman
E P LURIBUS UNUM
NATIONAL T RA
SPOR TATION
BOARD
SAFETY
N
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594
Safety Recommendation
Date: April 15, 2002
In reply refer to: A-02-06 and A-02-07
Honorable Jane F. Garvey
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, D.C. 20591
______________________________________________________________________________
On March 17, 2001, about 0708 eastern standard time, an Airbus Industrie A320-200,
N357NW, manufacturer serial number 830, being operated by Northwest Airlines as flight 985,
ran off the runway and onto terrain during a rejected takeoff at the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne
County Airport, Detroit, Michigan. An emergency evacuation was performed. The captain, first
officer, 4 flight attendants, and 145 passengers were not injured. Three passengers reported
minor injuries that occurred during the emergency evacuation. The airplane sustained substantial
damage. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 flight was operating in instrument
meteorological conditions, and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed. The flight
was destined for Miami, Florida.
The flight crew reported that, during the takeoff roll at an airspeed of about 110 knots,1
the nose of the airplane began to lift off the runway. In a postaccident interview, the captain
stated that he continued the takeoff to rotation speed, but, because he believed the airplane pitch
was uncontrollable, he initiated a rejected takeoff. The airplane then became airborne and
climbed a few feet. As the airplane returned to the surface, its tail struck the runway. The
airplane traveled about 700 feet off the end of the 8,500-foot runway and came to rest in muddy
terrain.
During the investigation, National Transportation Safety Board staff determined that the
airplane was loaded so that its center of gravity (CG), although within limits, was in the aft
region of the permissible range. Further, the flight crew had incorrectly set the trim for the
trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) at -1.7°UP (airplane nose up). This setting resulted in a
pitch-up trim condition. The proper trim setting, 1.7°DN (airplane nose down), would have
1 The computed rotation speed used for this flight was 143 knots.
2
resulted in a correct trim condition for the way the airplane was loaded. The improperly set trim
caused the nose of the airplane to lift off the runway prematurely.2
The Safety Board is aware of a similar event that occurred in April 2000 when the crew
of a Lufthansa A320-200 flight departing Brussels successfully aborted takeoff without incident
after the nose began to lift off below its computed rotation speed. The postincident investigation
conducted by the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation and Lufthansa
revealed that the airplane was loaded with an aft CG, and that the flight crew had inadvertently
　
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