(b)
The Working Group evaluate the threat of cyber attacks and disseminate the results of its analysis on the secure website by the end of June 2009 and that, depending on the results of this analysis, the Working Group on Amendment 12 to Annex 17 consider developing an amendment to Annex 17 for presentation at the 21st Panel meeting.
(c)
The ICAO Secretariat issue an electronic bulletin reminding States of the importance of subscribing to the PoC Network and providing information on its usage.
(d)
The concept of building unpredictability into the aviation security regime be further considered.29
29See Report of the Aviation Security (AVSEC) Panel, Twentieth Meeting, AVSECP/20 at 2.1.
C. Emerging Threats
VII. Bioterrorism
The recent recreation of the Spanish .u virus that killed 50 million people world-wide in 1918 proves that deadly viruses are being revisited and are undergoing genetic modi.cation. This brings to bear the inevitable question as to whether there is enough security to stop them from falling into the wrong hands. There is also the ominous prospect – that transportation of these dangerous pathogens by air would leave aviation vulnerable. This article examines precautionary measures currently being taken and the legal and regulatory signi.cance of such measures.
The leakage of dangerous pathogens30
from laboratories presents an ominous analogy to the aviation sector in that the same could well occur in the carriage of such dangerous goods by air. Although past instances of escaping dangerous pathogens are small in number, nonetheless their occurrence and the threat posed to the wellbeing of humanity cannot be underestimated. In 2002 when Anthrax spores escaped from two military laboratories in the United States, the authorities agreed that the leakage was due to a security lapse.31
In 2003 a string of such leakages occurred in Asia, this time of the SARS virus.32
It is now known that the laboratory is not the only place where security lapses could occur. Modern exigencies require samples of deadly pathogens to be trans-ported regularly over vast distances to reach researchers across the world. This calls for a delicate balance between recognizing the compelling need for scientists to exchange and collectively use different strains in order to identify naturally occur-ring diseases and mutations on the one hand and ensuring that the transport of these infectious substances33
are carried out according to United Nations Model Regula-tions34
on the other. These model regulations are the base upon which speci.c
30Pathogens are micro-organisms (including bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, parasites, fungi) or recombinant micro-organisms (hybrid or mutant) that are known or are reasonably expected to cause infectious disease in humans or animals.
31An year earlier, a covert event occurred in October 2001 when anthrax spores were sent through the mail exposing persons in the eastern USA to contaminated mail resulting in deaths, illnesses and identi.ed exposures to Anthrax. Overt, announced events, in which persons are warned that an exposure has occurred, have taken place in the United States, although most of these were determined to have been hoaxes, that is, there were no true exposures to infectious agents.
32The leakages occurred in China, Taiwan and Singapore. See Air-Tight Security, Intersec, June
2007, 33–35 at 34.
33Infectious substances are de.ned as substances known to contain, or reasonably expected to
contain, pathogens.
34The United Nations has developed recommendations on model regulations for the transport of dangerous goods which recognize that various chemical combinations and mixtures have different requirements in packing for the purpose of transport. See Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Model Regulations, Volume 1, 14th Revised Edition: 2005, Chap. 2.6, 中國航空網(wǎng) www.k6050.com 航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn 本文鏈接地址：Aviation Security Law 航空安全法(19)
