Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat, Rand Corporation, 2005, at 9.
C. Emerging Threats 27
doubt that most of them maintain strict security measures to prevent the out.ow of the weapons. However, it has been alleged that some States, including Libya, have supplied PGMs to terrorist organizations. It is incontrovertible that in the hands of terrorists these missiles are not likely to be used against conventional targets such as tanks and military .ghter aircraft. Of particular concern is the prospect of civilian airliners being shot at by SAMs and anti-tank rockets as they land at or take off from airports49
Dr. Richard Clutterbuck subsumes the great threat of missile attacks:
Recent years have seen increasing use of expensive and sophisticated surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles (SSM and SAM) by terrorists, generally of Russian or East European origin and redirected by Arab Governments, notably Colonel Gada.’s. Continuing development of these weapons for use by regular armies will ensure that new and more ef.cient versions will become available for terrorists.50

With increased airport security, the possibility of placing explosive devices on civil aircraft is becoming more dif.cult, but now the same destructive result can be achieved far more easily by using modern missiles or rockets.
There are a few incontrovertible truths that drive the issue of the illegal carriage of infectious pathogens by air. The .rst is that, as recognized by WHO, the lead role in legislative and regulatory control of the issue lies well within ICAO. The second is that, one has to go back to the basics of the rule book and start with the Preamble to the Chicago Convention. The Preamble unequivocally links the future develop-ment of aviation to “general security” which essentially means that aviation should not only be concerned with persons and property directly involved with air transport but also with the rest of the world that might be adversely affected by the release of infectious pathogens through aviation.
The third home truth is that it is a pre-eminent responsibility of States to ensure security at laboratories in their territories as the illegal carriage of infectious substances by air is liked to the initial leakage from a laboratory. Therefore it is extremely important for States to strictly enforce their dangerous goods legislation. It is also important to treat this subject holistically in terms of the world at large and not restrictively by singling out only those involved in the .ight concerned. Finally, States have to adopt a security culture that admits of an overall approach to the threat as a potential harm to the health of humanity. This should inevitably include strict adherence by States to the provisions of Annexes 17 and 18 and inclusion of new Standards in the Annexes as necessary, together with an abiding understanding that the illegal carriage of infectious pathogens by air portends a threat both to safety and security of aviation.
As for cyber-terrorism, the offences related to cyber-terrorism should be addressed on the basis that individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by an individual State. By the same token, it must also mean that individual States owe their citizens and the world at
49Hanle (1989, p. 185), Ofri (1984, p. 49), Pierre (1975, p. 1256), Dorey (1983, p. 142). 50Clutterbuck (1991, p. 175).
large a responsibility for maintaining world security. The philosophy of these two premises has to be vigorously employed in bringing to fruition the above measures. It is only then that a substantial legal contribution could be made to the controlling of this offence.
Finally, with regard to MANPADS, the gathering of reliable intelligence remains the .rst line of defense. Although modern technologies clearly aid terror-ists in terms of weapons and targets, technology can also be used against terrorists. Governments which are endowed with the necessary technology can keep track of terrorist organizations and their movements with the aid of computers. At the same time, electronic collection methods and signals intelligence afford the possibility of eavesdropping on and intercepting terrorist communications, leading to better predictions of their operations. One of the instances where intelligence gathering has worked well to prevent terrorism occurred in September 1984, when the Provisional IRA spent an estimated ￡1.5 million in the United States on a massive shipment of seven tons of arms. With the help of an informer about a forthcoming shipment of weapons, including rockets, to the Provisional IRA from the United States, the FBI informed British intelligence, who in turn contacted the Irish, and the ship carrying the arms was tracked by a US satellite orbiting 300 km above the earth. The satellite photographed the transfer of the arms to a trawler. Finally, two Irish Navy vessels intercepted the trawler and British security forces arrested the crew.51
　
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