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277Afour pronged approach to set in place a causal model has been suggested. These four steps are: a factual test as to whether an act or omission can be regarded as State conduct, by the operation of attribution principles; a legal test as to whether the attributed act or omission constitutes a violation of an international legal obligation of that State; a causal test to determine the scope of responsi-bility that potentially arises from a wrongful act or omission of that State; and a policy test to determine whether non-causal considerations justify enhancing or diminishing the responsibility of the State. See Becker(2006, p. 332).
278UK v. Albania, [1949] ICJ Rep. 4 (9 April) at 22.
279See AVSECP/20 Report Appendix C to the Report on Agenda item 1 at 1–10.

B. Innovative Security Tools 109
explosive devices, cyber attacks on aviation systems including air traf.c manage-ment systems, it would be much more prudent to concentrate on countering unlawful interference with aviation.
B. Innovative Security Tools
I. Biometric Identi.cation
Aviation has reached the stage where quantum physics not only assists in the aeronautical aspects of air transport but also contributes to the day to day activities involving passenger clearance, immigration and customs. A brand new technique known as quantum cryptography is on the way, calculated to eliminate the terrifying vulnerabilities that arise in the way digitally stored data are exposed to fraudulent use. This new technique uses polarized photons instead of electronic signals to transmit information along cables. Photons are tiny particles of light that are so sensitive that when intercepted, they immediately become corrupted. This renders the message unintelligible and alerts both the sender and recipient to the fraudulent or spying attempt. The public key directory (PKD) – designed and proposed to be used by customs and immigration authorities who check biometric details in an electronic passport, is based on cryptography – and is already a viable tool being actively consideredby the aviation community asa fail-safe method for ensuring the accuracy and integrity ofpassport information. This article examines the technical and legal consequences that might .ow from the use of the public keydirectory.
Starting from the premise that the passport is primarily a document which establishes the identity of the holder,280 the various approaches281 taken by
280See Naziranbai v. the State, 1957 Madhya Bharat Law Reporter, at 1, where the court recognized the passport as essentially being a document of identity and nationality issued to citizens or subjects of a state who intend to travel overseas. See also Turack(1972, pp. 20–21). Also, Abeyratne, infra, note 294, at 10.
281ICAO has been working on the development of passports since 1968. The Seventh Session of the ICAO Facilitation Division in 1968 recommended that a small panel of quali.ed experts including representatives of the passports and/or other border control authorities, be established: to determine the establishment of an appropriate document such as a passport card, a normal passport or an identity document with electronically or mechanically readable inscriptions that meet the requirements of document control; the best type of procedures, systems (electronic or mechanical) and equipment for use with the above documents that are within the resources and ability of Member States; the feasibility of standardizing the requisite control information and methods of providing this information through automated processes, provided that these processes would meet the requirements of security, speed of handling and economy of operation. See Facilitation Division, Report of the Seventh Session, 14–30 May 1968, ICAO Doc 8750-FAL/564, Agenda Item 2.3, at 2.3-4. See also AT-WP/1079, 1/12/70, Attachment A, which sets out the Terms of Reference of the Panel.
ICAO282in advancingtechnologiesthat facilitatethistaskatbordershaveevolved into the use of biometric identi.cation of the passport holder as the ultimate frontierin theidenti.cation process.Thetechniques ofbiometrics employedin a machine readable travel document (MRTD), be it a visa or passport,283 enable the user to uniquely encode a particular physical characteristic of a person into a biometric identi.er or biometric template which can be veri.ed by machine to con.rm or deny a claim regarding a person’s identity. Accordingly, biometric identi.cationof a personeither correctly establisheshis identity as beingconsis-tent with what is claimed in the passport he is holding or brings to bear the possibility that thepersoncarryinga particular passportisanimposter.Abiomet-ricisa measurable, physicalcharacteristicorpersonaltraitusedto recognizethe identity, orverify284 theclaimed identityofaperson. Inthemodern context, biometrics are usually incorporated in an MRTD with a view to achieving .ve goals, the .rst of which is global interoperability285 enabling the speci.cations of biometricsdeployedintraveldocuments acrosstheworldtobeappliedandusedin auniversally operablemanner. Thisisacriticalneedif the smooth applicationof biometric technology were to be ensured across borders. The second goal is to ensureuniformity within Statesinspeci.c standard settingbyStates authorities whodeploybiometricsintravel documents issuedby them.Thethirdistechnical reliability, where States are required to ensure that technologies used in deploying biometrics are largely failure-proof and of suf.cient quality and standardto ensure a State immigration authority reading documents issued by other States them that the
　
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