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Chapter 6 Aviation Security Audits
As discussed earlier, on the basis of Assembly Resolution A33-1 adopted in 2001 and the recommendations of the High-level, Ministerial Conference on Aviation Security (Montreal, February 2002), the Council adopted in June 2002 the Aviation Security Plan of Action, which included the establishment of a comprehensive programme of regular, mandatory, systematic and harmonized audits to be carried out by ICAO in all Contracting States. The ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) was subsequently launched, with the objective of all Contracting States having bene.ted from an initial audit by the end of 2007.
The ICAO USAP has been implemented on schedule and within its budget allocation. The audits have proven to be instrumental in the identi.cation of aviation security concerns and in providing recommendations for their resolution. From its inception, the USAP has enjoyed the support of Contracting States and is promoting positive change as States become increasingly sensitized to the interna-tional requirements. The USAP follow-up missions have validated a markedly increased level of implementation of ICAO security Standards, thereby attesting to States’ commitment to achieving the objective of the USAP to strengthen aviation security worldwide.
A security culture, if such were to exist among ICAO’s member States, would mean that the States would be aware of their rights and duties, and, more impor-tantly, assert them. Those who belong to a security culture also know which conduct would compromises security and they are quick to educate and caution those who, out of ignorance, forgetfulness, or personal weakness, partake in insecure conduct. This security consciousness becomes a “culture” when all the 190 member States as a whole makes security violations socially and morally unacceptable within the group.
All ICAO Member States are to have been successfully audited by the end of 2007, with strengths and weaknesses identi.ed, regional and global trends tracked, and recommendations made to States for improving their security regimes. How-ever, there remains a small number of States that have made little or no progress in implementing the ICAO recommendations to correct the de.ciencies identi.ed through the audits. Although security audit information has been restricted in the
R. Abeyratne, Aviation Security Law, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-11703-9_6, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010
past, steps should be taken to increase the transparency of the audit programme and ensure that the global aviation network remain protected. It is therefore proposed that, in addition to a review of de.ciencies by the Audit Results Review Board, consideration be given to the development of a process that will notify all Member States when de.ciencies identi.ed during the course of a USAP audit remain unaddressed for a sustained period. A noti.cation process could involve the use of information which does not divulge speci.c vulnerabilities but enables States to initiate consultations with the State of interest to ensure the continued protection of aviation assets on a bilateral basis.
Upon completion of a USAP audit, States are required to submit a corrective action plan addressing de.ciencies and schedule a follow-up visit. Audit follow-up visits were initiated in mid-2005 in order to validate the implementation of States’ corrective action plans and to provide support to States in remedying identi.ed de.ciencies. These visits are normally conducted in the second year following the date of a State’s audit. According to USAP reports, follow-up visit results have shown that the majority of States have made progress in the implementation of their corrective action plans. The average implementation rate of Annex 17 Standards in visited States increased signi.cantly when compared with the initial audit results. At the same time, however, it is signi.cant to note that follow-up visits have also revealed that there remains a small number of States that have made little or no progress in implementing the ICAO recommendations to correct the de.ciencies identi.ed through the audits.
　
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