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Mind Set
A pilot displays mind set through an inability to recognize and cope with changes in a given situation.
Get-There-Itis
This disposition impairs pilot judgment through a fixation on the original goal or destination, combined with a disregard for any
alternative course of action.
Duck-Under Syndrome
A pilot may be tempted to make it into an airport by descending below minimums during an approach. There may be a belief that
there is a built-in margin of error in every approach procedure, or a pilot may want to admit that the landing cannot be completed
and a missed approach must be initiated.
Scud Running
This occurs when a pilot tries to maintain visual contact with the terrain at low altitudes while instrument conditions exist.
Continuing Visual Flight Rules (VFR) into Instrument Conditions
Spatial disorientation or collision with ground/obstacles may occur when a pilot continues VFR into instrument conditions. This can
be even more dangerous if the pilot is not instrument rated or current.
Getting Behind the Aircraft
This pitfall can be caused by allowing events or the situation to control pilot actions. A constant state of surprise at what happens
next may be exhibited when the pilot is getting behind the aircraft.
Loss of Positional or Situational Awareness
In extreme cases, when a pilot gets behind the aircraft, a loss of positional or situational awareness may result. The pilot may not
know the aircraft’s geographical location or may be unable to recognize deteriorating circumstances.
Operating Without Adequate Fuel Reserves
Ignoring minimum fuel reserve requirements is generally the result of overconfidence, lack of flight planning, or disregarding
applicable regulations.
Descent Below the Minimum En Route Altitude
The duck-under syndrome, as mentioned above, can also occur during the en route portion of an IFR flight.
Flying Outside the Envelope
The assumed high-performance capability of a particular aircraft may cause a mistaken belief that it can meet the demands
imposed by a pilot’s overestimated flying skills.
Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists
A pilot may rely on short- and long-term memory, regular flying skills, and familiar routes instead of established procedures and
published checklists. This can be particularly true of experienced pilots.
Figure 9-7. All experienced pilots have fallen prey to, or have been tempted by, one or more of these tendencies in their flying careers.
9-13
PROGRAMMING
PLAN
PLANE
PILOT
PASSENGERS
Figure 9-8. The 5P checklist.
SRM and the 5P Check
SRM is about gathering information, analyzing it, and making
decisions. Learning how to identify problems, analyze the
information, and make informed and timely decisions is not
as straightforward as the training involved in learning specific
maneuvers. Learning how to judge a situation and “how to
think” in the endless variety of situations encountered while
flying out in the “real world” is more difficult. There is no
one right answer in ADM; rather, each pilot is expected to
analyze each situation in light of experience level, personal
minimums, and current physical and mental readiness level,
and make his or her own decision.
SRM sounds good on paper, but it requires a way for pilots
to understand and use it in their daily flights. One practical
application is called the “Five Ps” (5 Ps). [Figure 9-8] The
5 Ps consist of “the Plan, the Plane, the Pilot, the Passengers,
and the Programming.” Each of these areas consists of a
set of challenges and opportunities that face a single pilot.
And each can substantially increase or decrease the risk
of successfully completing the flight based on the pilot’s
ability to make informed and timely decisions. The 5 Ps are
used to evaluate the pilot’s current situation at key decision
points during the flight, or when an emergency arises. These
decision points include preflight, pretakeoff, hourly or at the
midpoint of the flight, predescent, and just prior to the final
approach fix or for visual flight rules (VFR) operations, just
prior to entering the traffic pattern.
The 5 Ps are based on the idea that the pilot has essentially
five variables that impact his or her environment and that can
cause the pilot to make a single critical decision, or several
less critical decisions, that when added together can create
a critical outcome. This concept stems from the belief that
current decision-making models tend to be reactionary in
　
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